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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation might best be described as a discussion and analysis of the 
tendency towards excess at the heart of modern American culture. In studying excess, 
the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer—whose writings on the limitless desire of the 
will had such a profound influence on the writers and thinkers at the end of the 19th and 
beginning of the 20th century— is linked to Emile Durkheim’s theory, which informs 
much of this study. Durkheim’s conception of anomie is examined using a combination 
of etymology and hermeneutics culminating in the understanding of anomie as 
derangement, or, as rules that are lack of rules.  
To illustrate this tendency in a concrete way, food is employed as a vehicle for 
discussion. I outline and critique the various definitions of food, and offer my own 
definition of food as something that sustains life, but does so through the utilization of 
the collective constituent elements (vitamins, minerals, calories) that naturally occur 
within a material substance. Defining food holistically and in terms of nature allows me 
to also identify unnatural foods by employing Durkheim’s concept of derangement.  
I trace the origins of excessive willing in modern American culture back to the 
Protestant religious doctrines of predestination and the calling, arguing that tendency 
towards worldly asceticism has been removed—replaced by an insatiable desire to 
consume more—and resulting in the formation of what I am calling the consumption 
industry. Recontexualizing Mestrovic’s postemotional theory, I contend that the food 
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industry in particular, and the consumption industry in general, rely on prepacked ideas 
as well as prepacked emotions to sell their foods in modern American society. This 
includes the consumption industry’s research on human biology and neurology—which 
has led to the production of deranged foods that actually induce hunger in consumers. 
Finally, the rise of monopoly capitalism is examined in light of Eros’ unitive power—
highlighted through a comparison of Plato, Freud, and Durkheim— leading to the 
conclusion that the modern spirit of capitalism is postemotional Eros – a drive towards 
greater unity, divided against itself, fueled by recycled emotions and inflamed desires.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 In pushing sociology of food in a new direction, I rely heavily on the work of 
five social theorists: Arthur Schopenhauer, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, David 
Riesman, and Stjepan Mestrovic. Prior to recontexualizing their ideas, it would be 
helpful to understand the ideas in the context in which they arose. To this end, it is useful 
to offer some context about their lives and the particular contributions each thinker made 
to social theory. Since each theorist builds on the one before him, I will proceed in 
chronological order beginning with Schopenhauer and ending with Mestrovic. 
 The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) sought to fashion his 
own philosophical system using a combination of Plato’s philosophy, Kant’s philosophy, 
and the writings of the Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu religions. His most famous work, 
The World as Will and Representation (1818), was published after nearly a decade of 
work and argued that there was a division between everyday consciousness and a higher 
state that transcended the world of appearance and glimpsed a “more real” world1. In 
discerning between the world of appearance the world of something more real, 
Schopenhauer echoed Plato’s writing of the “Forms” or “Ideas.” Schopenhauer’s 
insistence that there was a more real world was also indebted to Kant’s distinction 
between phenomenon and noumenon, that is, between representations and things in 
themselves. However, unlike Kant, Schopenhauer believed that it was possible to attain 
                                                
1	  See Janaway’s A Very Short Introduction to Schopenhauer (2002)	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knowledge of the thing in itself—Schopenhauer called this thing-in-itself “will,” and 
described it as an endless striving—through our perceptions of our own bodily processes 
and desires. This is a difficult thing to explain philosophically, but Schopenhauer, who 
originally wanted to be a doctor, makes extended use of his considerable knowledge of 
biology and physiology in offering examples that illustrate the blind striving of the will 
as a deeper knowledge. All in all, Schopenhauer’s philosophy devoted tremendous 
attention to the distinction between will and representations, that is, between the forms 
of things as they appear to the senses and things as they are beyond the reach of the 
senses. Schopenhauer became extremely famous in the 1880s up to the fin de siècle of 
the 19th century, shortly before his death, but the height of his fame happened to overlap 
with the birth of sociology. Schopenhauer’s ideas would influence thinkers even after his 
death including important thinkers like Wilhelm Wundt, Sigmund Freud, Georg Simmel, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Ferdinand Tönnies and the next social theorist on my list—Emile 
Durkheim.   
 Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was another of these important social thinkers who 
was tremendously influenced by Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Born in Epinal, Alsace-
Lorraine, a contested region on the border of Germany and France, Durkheim—whose 
given name was actually David—was the descendent of seven generation of Rabbis. 
Contrary to many accounts that portray Durkheim as an atheist, Durkheim was a 
practicing Jew throughout his life and even took the train out to Epinal on Friday 
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afternoons so he could attend synagogue with his mother.2 In light of these facts, 
Durkheim’s concern with establishing a science of morality—and his concern with 
morality in general—seems intimately bound up with his Rabbinical heritage since his 
moral concerns were sublimated through a scientific rather than a rabbinical outlook. It 
is worth pointing out that at the time of his birth, Epinal was under Prussian control, 
meaning Durkheim essentially grew up as a German Jew. In fact, his parents fled from 
Germany to Alsace-Lorraine to escape anti-Semitism.  This makes his decision to study 
in Germany with Wilhelm Wundt after completing his Doctorate in Philosophy (not 
sociology) in France a little less confusing—since he was fluent in German. It also 
provides a link between Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which was an all-pervading cultural 
force in Germany towards the end of the 19th century, and Durkheim’s unique brand of 
sociology as the science of morality.  
 Despite his German/Jewish origins and his background in philosophy, Durkheim 
is usually portrayed as the quintessential French positivist and a discipline of Auguste 
Comte. This is surprising since Durkheim criticized Comte throughout his work, and 
anointed Henri Saint-Simon as the founder of sociology, a distinction usually given to 
Comte. Durkheim’s philosophical training is on full display in his Rules of the 
Sociological Method (1895) as he describes both a new metaphysical system where 
social facts are real and independent of social actors, and a new epistemology for the 
study of these social facts. The new methodology for studying food advanced in this 
                                                
2	  See Mestrovic’s Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology (1988)	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dissertation reaches back to Durkheim for both inspiration and direction so that in 
recontexualizing his work, I remain faithful to his ideas even as I use them in different 
ways.  
 Finally, it must be noted that Durkheim is not just some “old dead white man,” as 
a senior colleague suggested to me recently. As I noted earlier, Durkheim’s given name 
was David, yet he changed it to Emile to avoid the anti-Semitism that was common in 
France during his life time. Thus any conception of white-privilege that modern scholars 
might attribute to Durkheim—as my colleague wished to do—is a misconception and is 
misplaced, since his Jewishness afforded him no privilege. Despite his brilliant academic 
gifts, Durkheim struggled to establish sociology as a serious academic discipline after 
Auguste Comte failed to do so. One need only look at the prefaces to his major works—
especially the second preface in The Division of Labor in Society (1893)—for evidence 
of a scholar tired of being misunderstood. One must keep Durkheim’s Jewish identity 
and his philosophical training in mind when addressing his thought: to ignore either is to 
misunderstand the life and work of one of sociology’s most brilliant thinkers.  
 The German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) is also a key component of this 
dissertation project. Weber’s magnum opus, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1904), outlined the Protestant doctrines of the calling and of predestination 
as social forces that influenced the development of Capitalism in America. This is the 
exact opposite of arguments made by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto 
(1848)—Marx and Engels argued that class struggle had been the driving force of 
history and was responsible for the formation of the various modes of production 
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(primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism) as well as 
social institutions (religion, the family, government)—since Weber sees  economic 
activity as driven by the religious beliefs of the Protestant congregation. Weber also 
described what he called the “routinization” of charisma, by which he meant that 
persons, things, and ideas regarded as charismatic were endowed with authority that 
people respected. When such charismatic persons, things, and ideas begin to fade, their 
charisma is routinized in an effort to keep their teachings and saying alive. However, in 
attempting to keep this charisma alive outside of what William James called first-hand 
experience, the intuitive and perceptive elements of the original charisma become rigid 
and are interpreted in a rigid way. What is left is an iron cage of dogmatism, devoid of 
the relational and emotional elements that once moved people in a profound way.  
 The American lawyer and sociologist David Riesman (1909-2002) plays both a 
direct and indirect role in the formation of this dissertation’s argument. Born the son of 
wealthy German Jews in Philadelphia, Riesman graduated from Harvard with his 
Bachelor’s in biochemistry before returning to Harvard’s law school to complete his law 
degree Riesman was an amateur sociologist in the traditional sense, since he did not 
possess a Doctoral degree in sociology—indeed, he held no PhD in any field. In 1950, 
Riesman published what would become one of the best-selling sociology books of all-
time, The Lonely Crowd. His analysis of 1950’s American society shifting from a culture 
driven by production to one driven by consumption was revolutionary and landed him a 
job in Harvard’s sociology department, albeit, against the wishes of the department and 
at the behest of the university President. Combining the insights gleaned from his 
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readings of classical social theorists like Marx, Durkheim, and Weber with more fringe 
social thinkers like Erich Fromm (who was Riesman’s therapist) and Thorstein Veblen 
resulted in a novel perspective of American society that simultaneously took account of 
individual will and social forces. Riesman was the first social theorist to note that in 
modern society, children were socialized less by their parents and more by the media, a 
trend that has continued into our present times. Riesman also noted that cookbooks, 
which historically have been about teaching people (usually women) how to cook 
nutritious meals for their families, took a decidedly new turn in 1950s America. Riesman 
noted that cooking, which was usually viewed as a serious and necessary task, was recast 
as a fun and inclusive activity in these new cookbooks. Classics like Fannie Farmer’s 
Boston Cooking-School Cook Book (1896) were replaced by cookbooks like Irma 
Rombauer’s The Joy of Cooking (1931), which included sections on throwing parties and 
entertaining guests. Riesman’s insight that media was socializing people more than their 
parents is perfectly illustrated by his example of fun and social cookbooks which are 
supposed to bring people together but more realistically only offer an opportunity for 
curdled indignation and fake sincerity, as anyone who has ever thrown a dinner party 
and been left to clean up by themselves after feeding everyone surely understands.   
Stjepan Mestrovic (1955-) was Riesman’s student at Harvard and has become a 
well-regarded social theorist in his own right. Born the grandson of the famous Croatian 
sculptor Ivan Mestrovic, he immigrated to America when he was 6 years old. Mestrovic 
would go on to Harvard for college where he would obtain his Bachelor’s in Psychology 
and Social Relations, a Masters of Theological Studies, and a Masters of Education in 
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Clinical Psychology before going on to Syracuse to complete his PhD in Sociology. As 
one of Riesman’s students, Mestrovic read widely and drew inspiration from a wide 
variety of sources, but none more than Emile Durkheim. His Postemotional Society 
(1997) builds on Durkheim’s analysis of social life when the collective consciousness is 
wearing away and Riesman’s analysis of the other-directed society as driven by 
representations advanced through the media. Considering that he grew up in a family of 
artists, and that art is certainly an emotional medium, it makes sense that Mestrovic 
noticed and then drew attention to the fact that emotions are rarely considered as part of 
social theory. In fact, his Postemotional Society (1997) is an attempt to rectify this 
glaring gap in the literature by showing how modern society relies on prepackaged 
emotions as much, if not more than, it relies on the prepacked ideas best illustrated in the 
writings of George Orwell. In this way, Mestrovic’s work carries forward Weber’s 
concept of the routinization of charisma, only on a much larger scale since the 
routinization of charisma is now the dominant cultural practice exemplified by the fake 
sincerity and curdled indignation outlined in Riesman’s treatment of other-directed 
society in The Lonely Crowd (1950).  
Having placed my theoretical influences in their proper cultural context, the table 
has been set for my discussion of food and social theory. As one reads through the 
chapters it is the wish of this author that one might bear in mind the lives and times of 
the theorist employed. In recontexualizing their work, I sought to be as faithful to their 
original ideas as I possibly could, even as I pushed their ideas into new academic realms.  
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Broadly speaking, this dissertation is concerned with the tendency towards 
excess that is a cornerstone of modern American society. In choosing to investigate this 
tendency towards excess, I was surprised to discover that the tendency towards excess 
involved both excessive freedom—perhaps better described as the removal of restraints 
and regulations—and excessive restriction. Yet excessive freedom and excessive 
restriction are abstract theoretical constructs and offer little help in explaining the 
modern situation. In a time period marked by the loosening of traditional restrictions—
both social restrictions and biological restrictions—it is interesting to note that the 
restrictions on what we can and should eat continue to go up. To avoid the pitfall 
presented by abstraction, and in keeping with the explosion of literature on the food 
system, food is employed as a vehicle for discussing the modern obsession with excess 
since the consumption of food is fundamental to the existence of human life. 
Consequently, the various circumstances that food is consumed in offer sociologists a 
chance to study the different representations that may encompass the “Idea” of eating3.  
One such circumstance is the tendency towards over-consumption that is at the 
heart of the explosion of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease in countries all over the 
world. The other circumstance is the tendency towards under consumption, which is 
most easily observed in the behavior of the anorexic, for whom food is viewed as an 
obstacle to be avoided, rather than an essential nutrient to sustain life. A less extreme 
example would be the explosion of fad diets including Paleo, Atkins, The South Beach 
3 See Simmel’s essay The Sociology of the Meal for a fantastic discussion of this idea	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Diet, and Whole 30. In each of these diets, a particular food group is isolated as “the 
problem” and is subsequently excised from the diet of its adherents. In the case of Atkins 
and Paleo, the problem food group is carbohydrates, leading to diets that are heavy in 
protein, fruits, and vegetables. Proponents of the Paleo diet argue that this is precisely 
the diet of our Paleolithic ancestors who were supposedly much healthier than moderns 
with their “diseases of civilization,” which include heart disease, diabetes, and stroke.  
Aside from the obvious fact that the average lifespan of Paleolithic man was a 
fraction of the average lifespan of modern people, the Paleo dieters also ignore that the 
food consumed today, even if from the same food groups, are qualitatively different than 
the ones eaten by our ancestors. For example, the wild game that was part of the hunter 
gather diet was much leaner than the meats widely available today and was especially 
leaner than modern beef. Regardless, the modern scholar must face the fact that for 
much of human history it was carbohydrates that formed the bulk of the diet for the bulk 
of the population, the peasants, and that the word bread was used interchangeably as a 
synonym for the word “food4.”  
Studies have shown that humanity can subsist on diets high in fat, carbs, protein, 
vegetables, and fruits but it can’t subsist on a diet high in all of the above, or low in all 
of the above. As with Aristotle, the golden mean of eating between two extremes poses 
the best solution to these problems. Fad diets, for all their popularity, represent one 
extreme while anorexia and bulimia constitute the other. Fad diets distort the division of 
4	  For example, the Our Father says “give us this day our daily bread”	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labor by increasing the emphasis upon certain food groups and removing the emphasis 
on other. Yet health is about more than what you consume, it involves stress levels, 
exercise levels, sleep levels, and one’s sense of purpose. Health is therefore systemic and 
relational, and therefore irreducible if one hopes to account for the factors influencing 
health.    
To account for this dynamic view of health and food, I draw explicitly from 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy to argue that food is will and possesses a will to life. An 
apple tree wants to live just as much as a butterfly, an ox as much as a wolf, and ancient 
people as much as modern people. To this end, the problem of modern dietetics is rooted 
in more than individual experience and will power, but in the social arrangements people 
and institutions are in.  
In discussing the relations between people and institutions, my discussion of food 
includes an etymological study of Durkheim’s concept of anomie with additional 
emphasis placed on the division of labor’s role in his conceptualization of anomie as 
“derangement” –not normlessness. 
One may ask what anomie has to do with the food system? Derangement entails 
not just the disarrangement of the division of labor, but the exploitation by some of the 
parts at the expense of the other parts and the whole. The immorality implied in 
Durkheim’s concept of anomie is made explicit as the secular equivalent of sin. I expand 
this idea with special reference to St. Augustine’s theological anthropology—Augustine 
says that human beings are eccentric creatures who long for God— which I compare 
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with the metaphysics of Schopenhauer and Durkheim to illuminate their common 
conception of limitlessness and ceaseless desire which are the hallmarks of anomie.  
My discussion of deranged and immoral food is problematic given the ubiquity 
of the term “food.” To resolve this, I critique the various definitions of food, and 
subsequently advance my own working definition of food. Food refers to something that 
sustains life, but does so through the utilization of the collective constituent elements 
(vitamins, minerals, calories) that naturally occur within a material substance. In other 
words, food is the product of ecosystem which arose from the formation of moral 
constraints between organisms dependent upon one another. My insistence on the 
collectiveness of these elements is important, since it implies that the whole of any food 
is greater than the sum of its collective parts.  
To arrive at such a definition, Durkheim’s conception of the division of labor as a 
spontaneous and moral force is employed to aid in defining the difference between food 
and deranged food, thus creating a new means of talking about moral food that doesn’t 
rely on abstract models – economic or philosophical. The concreteness of my definition 
takes inspiration from Charles Darwin’s work on cooperation—as opposed to survival of 
the fittest—between organisms. The primacy of cooperation in social theory is outlined 
with special reference to the theories of Darwin, Durkheim, and Herbert Spencer.   
The influence of Mestrovic’s theory of emotion finds expression in my 
discussion of the role of emotions in Weber’s study of the Protestant ethic. The power of 
emotions in motivating the Protestant ethic is illustrated with quotes from the original 
study and a corresponding discussion of the downstream societal effects as primarily 
  12 
driven by emotion. The most important of these emotions was anxiety, particularly as it 
presents as anxiety about one’s fate as either saved (good list) or damned (bad list).  
Weber’s work is recontextualized to discuss the practices of large food 
companies in modern capitalism, specifically, their efforts to appear on the “good list.” 
For example, publicly traded companies tend to disparage emotions and emphasize 
rational choice when making decisions. Nonetheless, the stock market seems to fluctuate 
based on emotional responses, including the public perception of a company as weak, 
exploitative, or otherwise engaged in morally dubious practices. Consequently, modern 
companies appear to be concerned with being on the “good list” –which includes high 
profit margins, positive public image, and high sales volume—and the company must 
engage in business practices that give the impression that this is the case, even if the 
company is struggling.  
Building on Weber’s routinization of charisma and Mestrovic’s postemotional 
theory—with its emphasis on emotions and relations—I advance a new term into the 
sociological lexicon, “postemotional Eros,” to describe the driving force of modern 
society as one of superficial unity. Raw emotion, with its overwhelming highs and lows, 
is traded for the more stable prepackaged emotions which inform the economic, 
political, cultural, spiritual, and relational lives of modern people. Using Mestrovic’s 
postemotional theory and my concept of postemotional Eros, I reexamine the marketing 
practices of large food companies based on emotions and recontexualize them within the 
broader framework of a society that feeds on prepackaged emotions.  
  13 
Lastly, I discuss the food industry’s manipulation of natural cognitive, somatic, 
and emotional responses of its customers, arguing that doing so constitutes the 
derangement. This final contribution is perhaps the most significant since it acts as a 
midpoint between placing all the blame on the company or on the individual consumer 
since the manipulation of these natural responses is widespread throughout “the 
consumption industry” and, moreover, throughout modern consumer society.  
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CHAPTER II 
SCHOPENHAUER AND FOOD STUDIES 
“There is no sincerer love than the love of food” –George Bernard Shaw 
The above quote from George Bernard Shaw serves as the perfect primer for this 
dissertation’s principle argument which might be summed up as too much of a good 
thing is not good for you. Few people would argue that food is a bad thing, fewer people 
would argue that love is a bad thing, but many people recognize that love and food can 
become warped into something far different than their typical forms. When love lapses 
into obsession it ceases to be love because the lover has made the beloved into little 
more than an object— into something to be worshipped rather than in relation with. Why 
begin a dissertation by talking about love? What does this have to do with food? There is 
nothing wrong with loving food, or loving to eat for that matter. However, when one 
lives to eat rather than eats to live, the individual is likely to find themselves engaged in 
any number of dietary practices that are harmful to the human body. This obsession with 
eating has an opposite that is equally deranged, namely, an obsession with not eating. As 
Shaw’s quote illuminates the love of food is, to be sure, a sincere love. There is a certain 
level of respect that we have for people whose dietary practices require discipline such 
as strict locavores, vegetarians, fasters, or people who only eat organic food.  Yet, just as 
the love of eating can become a deranged obsession, so these disciplined dietary 
practices are equally capable of derangement culminating in eating disorders like 
bulimia and anorexia. This dissertation then, is concerned with the derangement of our 
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relationship with food in the United States in the 21st century where it manifests 
simultaneously as an obsession with consuming and with abstaining from consumption.  
The Current State of Food Studies 
Food research gained popularity in the 20th century and continues to gain 
momentum into the 21st century. Once almost the exclusive domain of historians and 
anthropologists, we now see philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, nutritionists, 
medical doctors, and evolutionary biologists weighing in on the food debate. The diverse 
disciplines engaged in this discussion have, for the most part, ignored the work of those 
researchers in fields different from their own. This tendency is beginning to falter with 
the introduction of food studies programs at several universities across the United States. 
These interdisciplinary programs introduce students to historical, anthropological, 
literary, sociological, and statistical methods of studying food. While the integration of 
all these positions is beyond the scope of this project, the fact remains that the diverse 
methodologies and disciplines that study food only add to the richness of the topic. 
 Adding to this diverse field of study is an important goal of this project; the 
means to achieve this goal begins with the introduction of Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy of the “will” to the sociology of food. The introduction of “will” to the study 
of food is not merely the addition of a concept, albeit an interesting one, to the study of 
food. It is an attempt to bridge the gap between materialist and symbolic studies of food. 
This project is therefore as concerned with removing epistemological boundaries in the 
study of food as it is with defining concepts like anomie. I am not proposing a 
philosophical proof, nor am I arguing that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is without issue, 
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but I am endeavoring to show the genealogy of ideas that Schopenhauer bequeathed to 
Durkheim and which Durkheim bequeathed to sociologists in general. The principle 
means of doing so will be the introduction of Durkheim’s sociology to the study of food. 
Mestrovic (1988) and Gunderson (2016) have already documented Schopenhauer’s 
influence on Durkheim specifically and I wish to point out several more examples of 
influence for the skeptical reader. In this way, the project can remain focused on the 
sociology of food without degenerating into a philosophical debate.  
Magee (1983) noted Schopenhauer’s tremendous influence on the fin de siècle at 
the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. This influence included the 
sociology of Durkheim and Simmel, the psychoanalysis of Freud and Jung, the literature 
of Melville and Proust as well as a host of other thinkers and artists. While the influences 
are certainly impressive, we still must ask why should we introduce “the will” as a 
metaphysical concept to the study of food in sociology? On the one hand, using 
Durkheim’s theory— with its documented Schopenhauerian influences— implies that 
we are accounting for the presence of “will” already. However, to leave this assumption 
hidden is to ignore one of the poles of homo duplex, or the dualism of human nature. 
Why is this problematic? The reply comes from an unexpected source, Talcott Parsons, 
who wrote: 
The sociologist must face the problems of human motivation whether he wants to 
or not. If he does not acquire a genuinely competent theory, he will implicitly 
adopt a series of ad hoc ideas which are no less crucial because they are 
exempted from critical analysis. Perhaps the situation is not altogether 
incomparable in reverse (Parsons, 1962, p. 61). 
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In other words, one cannot begin and end with rational choice—as the 
economists often do— as the starting and ending points of our investigation into why we 
eat what we do. The idea that every person weighs the pros and cons associated with 
everything that they put into their bodies is obviously false5. This is not to say that 
people can’t make rational decisions about what to eat, nor does it mean that they don’t 
make such decisions, but it does open the door to the possibility that people could 
overeat or under eat without rationalizing their decision. The exemplification of “will” in 
this project helps to account for the seemingly incompatible culinary dualism that has 
vexed modern researchers: the high rates of obesity and starvation in the same country.  
The discussion of this dualism has involved economics, race, ethnicity, culture, 
and gender but has neglected to account for the most striking feature of this dualism, the 
fact that it has two sides. Therefore, if we focus too much on obesity, we ignore the fact 
that there are people who are starving to death in the developed world in 2017. If we 
focus too much on food security and access to food, we ignore the fact that food security 
has improved to the point that obesity rates are at an all-time high and continue to grow.  
To approach this problem as an “if only” problem is to approach the problem 
with a deterministic mindset and ignore the non-rational and metaphysical dimensions of 
the problem. One such narrative goes that if only we had greater food security then 
people would be more likely to eat nutritious food and the obesity rate would go down. 
                                                
5	  Perhaps the reader thinks that this is too strong a statement, but I feel confident making it 
nonetheless. In his Confessions, St. Augustine describes an incident in his youth where he stole 
pears, not because he didn’t have them, nor because they were better than the ones he had, but 
only because they were “seasoned with sin.”	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The assumption is that obesity rates are locked up with issues related to social class, and 
by extension, with race and gender. The assumption that access to healthier food 
automatically corresponds to greater consumption of such food is a slippery slope. 
Clearly, if one doesn’t have access to healthy foods then they cannot eat them. However, 
it does not follow that limitless access to healthy food leads to their exclusive 
consumption. Indeed, the difference in obesity rates by social class indicate that every 
class is getting more obese and that lower class men are not much more obese than men 
in higher social classes. There is a sharp distinction in the obesity rates of women in 
lower classes and women in higher classes, suggesting that women are more likely to 
consume healthy foods if given access to them. The sharp contrast between gender and 
obesity leads us back to Parsons’ comment about sociology accounting for motivation. I 
contend that Schopenhauer—via Durkheim—offers us a means of addressing this 
problem. 
Schopenhauer’s Influence on Durkheim 
 I have already cited Magee’s (1983) study that emphasized the tremendous 
prestige and influence that Schopenhauer’s philosophy had on the thinkers and artists at 
the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. I have also stated that Mestrovic 
(1988) and Gunderson (2016) have shown that Durkheim’s writings bear a strong 
affinity to Schopenhauer’s and that this affinity is more than the result of chance. This is 
especially true concerning two concepts that are common to both thinkers: 
representations and will.  
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If one is to study food using the method proposed by Durkheim, one must clarify 
several assumptions that he took from Schopenhauer and which need to be stated as  
contextual statements given that our academic milieu in 2017 is quite different from the 
milieu Durkheim was writing in. With that in mind, I move to discuss the first common 
concept: representation. 
 According to Andre Lalande ([1926] 1980) representation refers to “something 
actually present and able to be sensed versus its “replacement” as an image in the mind 
of the observer” (Mestrovic 1988: p. 47). Schopenhauer’s magnum opus, Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung (1818), was translated into English as The World as Will and Idea 
or The World as Will and Representation. The translation helps us to clarify that 
Schopenhauer’s use of the German vorstellung approximates the English words idea and 
representation and the French word représentation that Durkheim was so fond of. While 
Durkheim’s use of the word representation may appear complicated at first glance, Janik 
and Toulmin (1973) argue that the word had been used in the drawing rooms of Vienna 
and Paris for at least a century before Durkheim used it. To this end, Schopenhauer 
begins The World as Will and Representation (1818/1959) with a discussion of 
representation: 
The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to every living 
and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstract 
consciousness … It then becomes clear to him that he does not know a sun and 
an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun and a hand that feels an earth; that the 
world around him is only as representation, in other words, on in reference to 
another thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself…everything that 
exists for knowledge, and hence the whole of this world, is only object in relation 
to subject, perception of the perceiver, in a word, representation (Schopenhauer, 
1818/1959, p.195).  
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These sentences appear in the opening paragraphs of chapter one in The World as 
Will and Representation and are significant for two reasons. First, Schopenhauer’s 
demand that we accept his claim that everything in the world is known to us as a 
representation indicates that Schopenhauer was following in the footsteps of Kant’s 
critique of pure empiricism (1788/ 1956). In doing so, Schopenhauer refuses to start with 
the object of our knowledge, nor the subject that brings the knowledge into abstract 
consciousness. Rather, he wants us to start with the representation (the idea) as 
independent of subject and object, and therefore, as something that might be studied. 
Second, Schopenhauer’s insistence is paralleled by Durkheim’s insistence that all of 
social life is composed of representations. The significance of this is great as Mestrovic 
(1988) notes “[t]his move barred any retreat to crude empiricism and realism” (p. 46).  
If Schopenhauer and Durkheim agreed— along with Kant—that one should start 
their investigation with representations, they also agreed that Kant’s argument that 
reason is an a priori faculty of the human mind was flawed. Schopenhauer argued that 
reason was the tool and servant of the “will” while Durkheim argued that reason was “a 
collective and impersonal product of historical development…a social faculty; it varies 
in relation to social structure” (Mestrovic, 1988, p. 50). Ellenberger (1970) summarizes 
Kant and Schopenhauer’s positions as follows: 
Kant distinguished the world of phenomena and the world of the thing in itself, 
which is inaccessible to our knowledge. Schopenhauer called the phenomena 
representations, and the thing in itself will, equating the will with the 
unconscious as conceived by some of the Romantics; Schopenhauer’s will had 
the dynamic character of blind, driving forces, which not only reigned over the 
universe, but also conducted man. Thus, man is an irrational being guided by 
internal forces, which are unknown to him and of which he is scarcely aware 
(Ellenberger, 1970, p. 208). 
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 The second important concept, common to both Schopenhauer and Durkheim, 
and mentioned in the quote above is “will.” While Schopenhauer and Kant agree that the 
will (Kant’s thing in itself) are beyond the scope of conceptual knowledge, 
Schopenhauer believes that we may reach the will via intuition of our immediate 
perceptions. Intuition serves us well in this regard but its findings are troubling as 
immediate perception reveals we are always in a state of desire and never in a state of 
rest. As Schopenhauer (1818) describes it: 
In fact, absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of the will 
in itself, which is an endless striving…Therefore the striving of matter can 
always be impeded only, never fulfilled or satisfied. But this is precisely the case 
with the striving of all the will’s phenomena. Every attained end is at the same 
time the beginning of a new course, and so on ad infinitum (Schopenhauer, 
1818/1969, p. 164).  
 
Schopenhauer argues that the “essential nature” of the will is the absence of all 
aims and all limits and that this nature could only be impeded, never satiated. This idea 
was tremendously influential in Durkheim’s sociology as he frequently mentions 
constraint— earning him the nickname the “sociologist of constraint”— and his concern 
that modern life has ceased to provide moral constraints on the egoistic will. In Moral 
Education (1925) Durkheim writes: 
The totality of moral regulations really forms about each person an imaginary 
wall, at the foot of which a multitude of human passions simply die without 
being able to go further. For the same reason – that they are contained – it 
becomes possible to satisfy them. But if at any point this barrier weakens, human 
forces – until now restrained – pour tumultuously through the open breach; once 
loosed, they find no limits where they can or must stop (Durkheim, 1925/1961, 
p.42).  
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Durkheim’s concern with moral regulation is a defining feature of all of his 
work. One might even make the argument that Durkheim’s metaphysical system directly 
parallels Schopenhauer’s from the start of his career. In Suicide: A Study in Sociology, 
published 28 years prior to Moral Education, Durkheim also took up this problem of 
unlimited individual desires and the forces that constrain them, writing:  
It has been claimed, indeed, that human activity naturally aspires beyond 
assignable limits and sets itself unattainable goals...However, one does not 
advance when one walks toward no goal, or—which is the same thing—when his 
goal is infinity...To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to 
condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness...[T]he more one has, the 
more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling 
needs (Durkheim, 1897/1951, p. 247–8). 
 
This closely parallels Schopenhauer’s position regarding the will as endless 
striving incapable of final satisfaction, only hindrance, and finally destined to result in 
suffering. 
[The will] always strives, because striving is its sole nature, to which no attained 
goal can put an end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final satisfaction; it 
can be checked only by hindrance, but in itself it goes on forever…[A]ll striving 
springs from want or deficiency, from dissatisfaction with one’s own state or 
condition, and is therefore suffering so long as it is not satisfied. No satisfaction, 
however, is lasting; on the contrary, it is always merely the starting point of a 
fresh striving. (Schopenhauer, 1818/1969, p. 308-309). 
 
Both Durkheim and Schopenhauer paint a pessimistic portrait of life as destined 
to result in suffering, a representation shared by a host of others including Plato in The 
Republic, Freud in Civilization and its Discontents, and the Second Noble Truth of 
Buddha. Plato concludes The Republic with the Myth of Er and its disturbing message 
that, given the choice, all souls choose a different life than the one they lived before. 
Thus, those who suffered greatly in the afterlife choose to be good in their next 
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reincarnation and those who were rewarded in the afterlife chose to be tyrants. This is 
not insignificant as Plato tells us that tyrants do not get a chance to pick a new life when 
they die, but their souls are forever confined to the underworld. Since all souls 
eventually pick lives different than the ones they lived previously, all souls eventually 
choose to be tyrants with philosophers being the one exception. 
This parallels the Christian parable— found in the Gospels of Mathew, Mark, 
and Luke of it being easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a 
rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. The implication is that those blessed with 
wealth, freed from the constraints of poverty, aspire to acquire more earthly possessions. 
These in turn become a barrier between the rich person and the eternal satisfaction 
available in the afterlife as described by Jesus and Plato alike. 
 Freud spends vast portions of Civilization and its Discontents (1930) writing 
about how people struggle to reduce their suffering, even going so far as to outline the 
three primary sources of suffering: 
We are threatened with suffering from three directions: from our own body, 
which is doomed to decay and dissolution and which cannot even do without 
pain and anxiety as warning signals; from the external world, which may rage 
against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction; and finally 
from our relations to other men. The suffering which comes to us from this last 
source is perhaps more painful to us than any other (Freud, 1930/1961, p.26). 
The Second Noble Truth of the Buddha more clearly expresses a metaphysical 
truth – the metaphor of unquenchable thirst to describe the will’s nature – found in the 
pessimism expressed by Plato, the Gospels, and Freud. This Second Noble Truth is 
summarized by Gethin as: 
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The suggestion is that deep in the minds of beings there is a greed or desire that 
manifests as an unquenchable thirst which is the principal condition for the 
arising of suffering...It is the cause of suffering because it can never be finally 
satisfied (1998: p. 70). 
 
It should be unsurprising then that, influenced as he was by Buddhist philosophy, 
Schopenhauer offers a near perfect copy of this metaphor as he writes: 
We call [striving’s] hindrance through an obstacle placed between it and its 
temporary goal, suffering...Willing and striving...can be fully compared to an 
unquenchable thirst. The basis of all willing, however, is need, lack, and hence 
pain, and by its very nature and origin it is therefore destined to pain. 
(Schopenhauer, 1818/1969, p. 309, 312) 
 
Finally, Durkheim too, offers us the same metaphor using nearly the same 
language in Suicide when he writes: 
Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition and insatiability is rightly 
considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely 
surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable 
thirst is constantly renewed torture (Durkheim, 1897/1951, p. 247).  
 
My purpose in taking such great pains to establish the linkages of this thought— 
that all of life naturally aspires beyond set limits and is therefore doomed to frustration 
and suffering— are three-fold. First, it serves as a perfect example of Durkheim and 
Schopenhauer’s assertion that representations have an existence outside of, and only 
partially dependent on, social actors’ conscious wills. Second, it helps to clarify both the 
definition and use of the term “representation,” which is essential to this project since 
Plato, Buddha, the Gospel Authors, Schopenhauer, and Durkheim all encounter and 
approach the world of representations, what Plato would have called the world of Forms 
or Ideas. Third, the temptation to think in deterministic “if only we do this, then 
everything will be fixed” terms is very strong when addressing social problems and 
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issues related to food like obesity and starvation certainly fall under this umbrella. I have 
thus taken great pains to establish that such thinking will not be used over the course of 
this work, as well as to establish all such thinking as overly simplistic and naïve.  
Food, Will, and Representation  
 Durkheim does not make food a primary topic of his investigations but his 
methodology is such that it can be applied to the investigation of a whole host of 
collective representations. Durkheim’s disciples employed his sociological method to a 
wide variety of interesting studies including memory (Maurice Halbwachs), linguistics 
(Louis Gernet), gifts (Marcel Mausse), even saints and heroes (Robert Hertz). The ability 
to study such a wide range of phenomena is possible because Durkheimian sociology 
starts with the representation (the idea), what might be described as the midpoint 
between object and subject. This dissertation seeks to study representations of food in 
the United States of America as they appear in the present and in recent history.  
 While Durkheim does not devote much attention to investigating food, 
Schopenhauer offers a plethora of food-related examples in his discussion of the will. 
For example, Schopenhauer offers the following discussion of the will, need, and 
hunger: 
Man needs the animals for his support, the animals in their grades need one 
another, and also the plants, which again need soil, water, chemical elements and 
their combinations, the planet, the sun…At bottom, this springs from the fact that 
the will must live on itself, since nothing exists besides it, and it is a hungry will. 
Hence arise pursuit, hunting, anxiety, and suffering (Schopenhauer [1818] 1969: 
p.154).  
 
 There are two important points made here that require clarification. The first is 
that despite the will striving blindly, its many gradations are all dependent upon one 
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another and constitute a massive system of checks and balances. These checks and 
balances are both material— as in the chemical, environmental, and nutritional 
requirements required to sustain life—as well as immaterial such as the mutual 
dependence created by the spontaneous division of labor. The second is that the will 
subsists on itself, meaning that all that consumes and is consumed is will. Yet 
Schopenhauer’s book is called The World as Will and Representation, so one must pause 
to ask: where is the representation, if nothing exists beside the will? Schopenhauer offers 
us a clue when describing the aesthetic contemplation of plant life writing: 
They (plants) therefore need the foreign intelligent individual in order to come 
from the world of blind willing into the world of representation. Thus they yearn 
for this entrance, so to speak, in order to attain at any rate indirectly what directly 
is denied to them (Ibid p. 201).  
 
Schopenhauer adds as a footnote that he advanced this idea with great trepidation 
but was delighted and surprised to find that St. Augustine had already made it in The 
City of God.  
The trees offer to the senses for perception the many different forms by which 
the structure of this visible world is adorned, so that, because they are unable to 
know, they may appear, as it were, to want to be known (Schopenhauer, 
1818/1969, p. 201).  
 
This is to say that trees offer much data to our sense perceptions about the 
structure of the visible world because they cannot know (i.e. are incapable of conceptual 
thought) and so appear to desire to be known. Here, again, we are met with the import of 
representation since the plants for Schopenhauer, and the trees for Augustine, are pure 
will and as pure will, strive and desire to be more. Therefore, one is left with this 
surprising revelation, namely, that all food is will but desires to be more, the attainment 
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of which is only possible indirectly by being drawn into the world of representation by a 
conscious being capable of abstract knowledge. Thus, attempts to describe food only as a 
collection of vitamins and chemical compounds or only at the symbolic level do violence 
to food as both representation and as will.  
Bearing all this in mind, this dissertation starts with two important assumptions 
that must be outlined in the interest of transparency and to avoid confusion: 
1)   At the metaphysical level, food is will, therefore, what is consumed is will 
even as the desire to eat and the act of eating are both also acts of will 
(desire).  
2)   Representations of food are always at risk of being destroyed by the will, 
which    breaks through the representation, but are nonetheless vital to 
constrain: 
 2a) individual will – what Durkheim and Schopenhauer call egoism 
 2b) deranged social will – consumerism for example  
 Durkheim’s method, which he refers to as renovated rationalism, gives us the 
tools to deal with this the complicated landscape that is the sociology of food. I want to 
be as clear as possible that I wish to highlight Schopenhauer’s thought not as the basis of 
a philosophical argument, for this is not an investigation into the philosophy of food, but 
as the starting point for understanding Durkheim’s perspective that is neither 
psychological nor focused purely on rational-choice. I wish to avoid any reductionist 
thinking on matters of food and social problems related to food. Henceforth, food will 
always be considered two: it lives and is lived, it is will and representation. 
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CHAPTER III  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
In this chapter, my goal is to lay out Durkheim’s understanding of anomie as 
derangement, rather than the incomprehensible “normlessness,” and then to critique 
previous studies of food in light of the insights provided by Durkheim’s definition. 
Anomie is perhaps one of the most controversial terms in sociology, as its definition has 
been the topic of numerous papers and presentations, but has only recently re-entered the 
realm of sociological discussion in the work of Mueller and Abrutyn (2016) in their 
studies of suicide. The historical usages of anomie, which Durkheim was sensitive to, 
will be the starting place for my inquiry.  
Anomie: The Roots and Meanings of Derangement 
 In this section, I begin by tracing the roots of the term “anomie” back to Ancient 
Greece and again in the works of Christian writers to clarify the term that Durkheim 
inherited. Second, I compare Durkheim’s own writings to those of his interpreters to 
illustrate that Durkheim’s sociology is built, not on preventing “normlessness,” but on 
preventing “derangement” in the division of labor. The alleged presence or absence of 
norms is trivial compared to the haunting picture that Durkheim paints of anomic society 
as “deranged” and full of suffering, torment, and unlimited desires. To understand 
Durkheim’s conception of anomie, and those that followed, we must understand the term 
that he inherited from his intellectual precursors as well as how his interpretation of 
anomie was elaborated by those who followed the misrepresentation of anomie as 
“normlessness” by Parsons and Merton. Durkheim noted the importance of such an 
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exercise when he wrote “a concept is not my concept; I hold it in common with other 
men…it is the work of a community (1912/1965, p. 481).  
It would seem that anomie was derived from the Greek a-nomos, which translates 
as “lawless or impious,” but this is not completely correct as the Ancient Greek 
understanding of law was different from that of modern people (Liddell and Scott, 1966, 
p. 147). The word Nomos originates from the word Moira, which means destiny, fate, 
and “that which is right” (Liddell and Scott, 1966, p. 1140-42). Cornford (1957) noted 
that Nomos and Moira were linked together by “the notion of dispensation” (p. 29). 
Originally, nomos referred to Zeus’ dispensation of land; next it referred to the 
dispensation of edicts by Pericles, lastly, it referred to reason— the ordering principle of 
philosophy (Cornford, 1957, p. 20-39; Hastings, 1961, p. 545-55; White and Riddle, 
1869, p. 526). Reason then, as it is understood and employed by philosophers, stems 
from Moira, just as Nomos does (Cornford, 1957, p. 35). The linguist Louis Gernet, a 
disciple of Durkheim, specialized in the language of ancient Greece and wrote that in 
addition to the Greeks’ scorn for hubris (pride) they believed that “nomos is [the] 
imperative rule derived from a collectivity that represents [etymologically] the principle 
of distribution” (Gernet, 1981, p. 329). Taken collectively, scholars paint a picture of 
nomos where the “dispensation of land, law, and reason are all conceived as sacred 
tasks; thus, the ‘mismanagement’ of any of these is understood as a form of sacrilege” 
(Mestrovic and Brown, 1985, p.  83). I am left to conclude that nomos in Ancient Greece 
implied that dispensation was a sacred task, and, as such, a-nomos would refer to the 
opposite, namely, the profaning of the dispensation of land, law and reason. Put 
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differently, a-nomos does not refer to profane lands, laws, and reasoning, instead, it 
implies that dispensation itself that has become profane. As an illustration of this point, 
in The Republic, Socrates insists that the ruler of his most just city would be a 
philosopher king or philosopher queen precisely because the sacredness of the task of 
dispensation is best allocated to those who desire it least.   
 The next time that anomie figured heavily in the treatment of social life occurred 
when the Bible was translated from Hebrew to Latin by St. Jerome, among others, and 
24 different Hebrew words for sin found in the Old and New Testaments were all 
translated as “anomia” (Lyonnet and Sabourin, 1970; Mestrovic, 1985). Anomia as sin 
does not simply refer to the conscious transgression of divine law, the breaking of the 
commandments, but that “God in some way, at least in the intention of the sinner, is hit, 
grieved, and, as it were, hurt” (Lyonnet and Sabourin, 1970, p. 14). Lyonnet and 
Sabourin go on to explain that sin was viewed as a debt, or a disease to be healed (p. 26), 
“not as a specified sinful deed, but as a power which governs men and inspires their 
conduct” (p. 27). In summary, anomia in the Biblical context is “the secret quality, the 
spirit, the tendency, which inspires the sinful actions and provokes them…a general state 
of hostility against God” (p. 30-33). What is this secret quality, the spirit that inspires the 
sinner to injure God himself?  
According to Christian teachers, the essential vice, the utmost evil, is Pride. 
Unchastity, anger, greed, drunkenness, and all that, are mere flea bites in 
comparison: it was through Pride that the devil became the devil: Pride leads to 
every other vice: it is the complete anti-God state of mind… (Lewis, 1936/1996, 
p. 109). 
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One such teacher, St. Augustine, characterized the sin of Adam and Eve as the 
result of their pride, for they desired to be more than God, and only then did they act. 
Consequently, their sin was not simply a transgression of God’s law, but derived from 
their libido dominandi, their lust to dominate God and usurp him as the Alpha and 
Omega. Augustine links the shame that envelops Adam and Eve after eating the apple to 
their revised understanding of what they are, beings that desire to usurp God, not just 
beings that disobey his orders. It is the why behind their what that makes the distinction. 
One may dig into the Christian Scriptures for more examples of this. For 
example, the Book of Genesis begins as a story of how God—who is the embodiment of 
the principle of dispensation—makes everything in relation to himself and for relation 
with himself, or, as Martin Buber would have put it, as a thou to his eternal I. The 
principle of dispensation is the fundamentally the opposite of pride or egoism for 
dispensation implies solidarity, and so further implies moral constraint. Pride warps the 
principle of dispensation into the principle of accumulation, whereby the sinner seeks to 
accumulate land, law, and reason, not for the purpose of dispensation, but in an effort to 
transcend all moral principles, and at the expense of others. As Lyonnet and Sabourin 
(1970) put it “to sin is to follow one’s fancy, unrestrained by the law of God” (p. 43). 
The sin of Adam and Even then is first committed in their hearts, throwing off the yoke 
of God’s law and seeking to usurp him, and their subsequent consumption of the apple is 
only a dull echo of the primary sin. In his course on St. Augustine’s masterpiece, The 
City of God, the Religious Studies Scholar, Charles Mathewes described St. Augustine’s 
anthropology of humanity as essentially theological, saying: 
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[For Augustine] The human in a creature who longs for God and, as such, the 
human is a creature of excess, of gratuity. We are eccentric, that is, having our 
centers outside of ourselves...wherever we are, we over spill our bounds, overrun 
our ends...Once we are untethered from God after the fall, our affections keep 
flowing from within us, snaking crazily across the surface of this world like a 
firehose out of control, shooting water this way and that. This is clearly manifest 
in our political lives, but it is also manifest elsewhere in our earthly lives 
(Mathewes 2017). 
 
 This depiction of humanity as essentially limitless after the fall of Adam and Eve 
is a pessimistic to be sure. Indeed, Augustine argued that the best happiness we could 
hope to attain on earth was mere “happiness in hope.” Such is the malady of the 
eccentric creature whose center is outside of itself. One may be confused how this 
theological anthropology influenced Durkheim, indeed, one may flatly deny that it could 
have. Yet in Suicide (1897/1951), Durkheim echoes Augustine’s charge that humanity is 
fundamentally eccentric: 
But how determine the quantity of well-being, comfort or luxury legitimately to 
be craved by a human being? Nothing appears in man’s organic nor in his 
psychological constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies…It is not human 
nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs. They are thus 
unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any 
external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and 
bottomless abyss (Durkheim, 1897/1951, p. 249).  
 
The importance of Durkheim’s depiction of humanity as fundamentally limitless 
is an important one, and consequently, the literature that treats humanity in a similar vein 
is an important part of the puzzle. This includes the literature on sin, as I have already 
shown how one of Augustine’s foundational charges was refracted through Durkheim. 
Thus, anomia as sin “is the inner dynamism of evil leading to, and manifesting itself in 
sinful actions” meaning “man cannot be liberated from the tyranny of sin except by 
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receiving a new dynamism, the life-giving Spirit, who works in man his reunion with 
God (Lyonnet, 1970, p. 291). For Durkheim, this dynamism comes from society— 
conceived as a system of representations (ideas)—but it can become deranged, sickly, in 
a word – anomic.  
The origins of anomie in Ancient Greece and in the Christian writings on sin 
were synthesized in the work of Samuel Johnson (1709-1784). Johnson, a British writer 
and poet, defined anomie as “breach of law” in his Dictionary of the English Language 
(1785). However, Johnson defined law as a “rule of action” which included such “laws” 
as decrees, edicts, statutes, customs, as well as those “rules or axioms of science: as, the 
laws of mechanicks,” jurisprudence, and the Bible. Johnson gave only one example of 
“anomy’s” usage, “If sin be good, and just, and lawful, it is no more evil, it is no sin, no 
anomy.” It is noteworthy that Johnson connects anomie, sin, and rule, thus synthesizing 
the Christian writings on sin with the Ancient Greek writings on the dispensation of law 
and reason. This is the anomie that Durkheim and his contemporaries inherited from the 
Ancient and not-so-ancient world. If they inherited its meaning, so too did they inherit 
the concerns which were the traditional context for its usage, including morality, 
suffering, and life in communion with others under a common rule of law. Insofar as 
Durkheim inherited anomie’s meaning and concerns, he passed on a new way to 
characterize these concerns, but he used an old vocabulary to do so. Having outlined 
anomie in the context of Greek philosophy and Christianity, I move to discuss anomie as 
it directly preceded Durkheim’s usage of the term in the work of the French poet and 
philosopher, Jean Marie Guyau (1854-1888). 
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Durkheim’s Critique of Guyau’s Moral Anomie, and Subsequent Use of Anomie 
In 1885, Guyau published Sketch of a Morality Without Obligation or Sanction in 
which he argued that “anomie” was, “c'est l'absence de foi fixe, qu'on peut designer sous 
le terme d'anomie, pour l'opposer a l'autonomie des Kantiens” (Guyau, 1885/1907, p. 
165).1 Lalande (1926/1976, p. 61) believed that Guyau used the term anomie to oppose 
Kant’s conception of autonomy with its repressive sense of duty. In 1887, Guyau 
published his Irreligion of the Future where he offered moral anomie as a rational 
alternative to religious dogmatism. Guyau, like Durkheim, understood anomie (a-nomos) 
not as lack of law, but lack of rule. Indeed, Guyau (1887/1962) writes, “we have 
proposed as the moral ideal what we have called moral anomie - the absence of any 
fixed moral rule” (p. 375). It is noteworthy that Guyau’s understanding of anomie as 
lack of rule bears some similarities to the definition put forth by Samuel Johnson, “the 
breach of law” [rule of action] and is given in a religious context, thus confirming my 
earlier argument about the nature and meaning of anomie that Durkheim’s milieu 
inherited.  
Durkheim’s first use of the term anomie can be found, not in his Division of 
Labor in Society (1893), but in his review of Guyau’s Irreligion of the Future (1887).  In 
this review, Durkheim says little about “moral anomie,” but he is critical of Guyau’s 
system of morality, which seems to focus on the individual being freed of obligation 
writing, “only the second ones [feelings of belonging to the social organism in its 
entirety] can generate the idea of obligation” (Durkheim, 1887, p. 309). Orru (1983) 
argues that this was Durkheim’s first exposure to the concept of anomie, one which left 
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an impression on him, and that his interest in the concept would continue to grow until 
he published The Division of Labor in Society (1893) and wrote: 
The sentiment of obligation, that is, the existence of duty, is in danger of 
being weakened in admitting there is a morality, and perhaps a higher, which 
rests on the independent creations of the individual, which no rule determines, 
which is essentially anomic. We believe, on the contrary, that anomie is the 
contradiction of all morality (Durkheim, 1893/1933, p. 431). 
We see at once that Durkheim’s first reference to anomie was focused on the 
philosophical movement towards “moral anomie,” which he explains as the weakening 
of the sentiment of obligation. Between the weakening of obligations and the lack of 
rule, which he also points out explicitly, Durkheim argues that anomie cannot be moral 
and the whole system of moral anomie rests upon a shaky foundation. If a new system of 
morality is to transcend an old, it may only gain adherents through the sentiment of 
obligation, that is, if people are bound by duty to accept it. Durkheim (1893/1984) wrote, 
“He who speaks of obligation speaks at the same time of constraint” (p. 13). For 
Durkheim, morality was bound to obligation, and so to constraint, thus he argued that the 
destruction of the sentiment of obligation and the prescription that morality should be 
determined by individuals, without any guiding rules, was the antithesis of morality. 
In Book Three (The Abnormal Forms) of The Division of Labor in Society, 
Durkheim writes, “we may say a priori that a state of anomie is impossible wherever 
organs solidly linked to one another are in sufficient contact, and in sufficiently lengthy 
contact” (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 304). The prevention of anomie then, lies in strong 
linkages between social organs, which remain in sufficiently lengthy contact with one 
another. Durkheim explains that this prevents anomie because, “indeed, being adjacent 
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to one another, they are easily alerted in every situation to the need for one another and 
consequently they experience a keen, continuous feeling of their mutual dependence,” in 
other words, they experience constraint (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 304). Durkheim 
continues: 
For the same reason, exchanges between them occur easily; being regular, 
they occur frequently; they regulate themselves and time gradually effects the 
task of consolidation. Finally, because the slightest reaction can be felt 
throughout, the rules formed this way bear the mark of it, that is, they foresee 
and fix in detail the conditions of equilibrium (1893/1984, p. 304).   
 
 Durkheim posits that exchanges between the social organs naturally occur 
frequently, regularly, and easily because they are mutually dependent upon one another. 
But what is this force that draws the social organs into mutual dependence, into 
regulation, into constraint, into obligation, and so into morality? Durkheim’s reply is that 
it is the spontaneous--not forced--division of labor. Durkheim understood the division of 
labor as an external force, which naturally draws the social organs into communion with 
one another. In this way, Durkheim’s conception of the division of labor is quite similar 
to the Ancient Greek principle of dispensation discussed earlier in this work. Recall that 
Louis Gernet, a linguist and a disciple of Durkheim’s, specialized in the language of 
ancient Greece and wrote that the Greeks found hubris (pride) to be contemptible and 
believed that “nomos is the imperative rule derived from a collectivity that represents 
[etymologically] the principle of distribution (Gernet, 1981, p. 329). Durkheim carries 
this idea forward arguing that it is egoism (pride) that destroys solidarity, that insults the 
collective, that defies the principle of distribution (i.e. dispensation), and creates the 
anomic forms of the division of labor.  
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Durkheim notes that the exchanges affect “the task of consolidation,” which we 
take to mean the consolidation of the social organs into an organism. After all, Durkheim 
wrote that society was an organism.2 The careful reader might be tempted to point out 
that the “task of consolidation” and the division of labor would seem to be opposing 
forces and, thus, Durkheim’s understanding of anomie and social solidarity rests on a 
contradiction. Durkheim offered the various academic disciplines as an example of this 
seemingly contradictory part of his theory:  
But the jurist, the psychologist, the anthropologist, the economist, the 
statistician, the linguist, the historian – all these go about their investigations 
as if the various orders of facts they are studying formed so many independent 
worlds. Yet in reality these facts interlock with one another at every 
point…Indeed they afford the spectacle of an aggregate of disconnected parts 
that fail to co-operate with one another. If they therefore form a whole lacking 
in unity, it is not because there is no adequate view of their similarities, it is 
because they are not organized... If the division of labor does not produce 
solidarity it is because the relationships between organs are not regulated; it is 
because they are in a state of anomie (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 304).  
 
 The division of labor, the Ancient Greek principle of dispensation, naturally 
produces solidarity between the disciplines by allowing each to focus their studies on a 
particular part of the common world, or as Durkheim put it: 
This solidarity resembles that observed in the higher animals. In fact each 
organ has its own special characteristics and autonomy, yet the greater the 
unity of the organism, the more marked the individualization of the parts…we 
propose to call organic the solidarity that is due to the division of labor 
(1893/1984, p. 85).  
 
Thus, in the absence of pride—which he later referred to as egoism—the division 
of labor, which I have now solidly linked to the principle of dispensation, leads to 
increasing specialization and so increasing interdependence, constraint, and solidarity. 
We might then invert Durkheim’s previous statement about organic solidarity and say 
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“the more marked the individualization of the parts,” “the greater the unity of the 
organism” (inverted for emphasis).  Having discussed anomie’s origins as the obverse of 
the principle of dispensation, we might add that “the nouns nómos and nomós both 
derive from the verb νέµω, némō, to dispense or to allot, with nomós being the result of 
allotment and nómos being the manner of allotment or dispensing (justice)” (“Nomos,” 
wikipedia).  Truly, consolidation does not oppose the division of labor (nómos, the 
manner of allotment) but is the product of the division of labor (nomós, the result of 
allotment). It appears that the ideas of justice, dispensation, and consolidation were all 
part of the Greek conception of “nomos,” and Durkheim’s conception of anomie was a 
refraction of a-nomos, that is, a deranged dispensation of justice or a forced 
consolidation.  
Therefore, in the absence of organic solidarity, this consolidated whole, does not 
fall on the shoulders of the division of labor, for it is the product of this division. 
Durkheim points out that if the disciplines do not appear as a unified (i.e. organic or 
consolidated) whole, it is not because the similarities between them are not observed, but 
because they are “deranged.” This derangement prevents the division of labor from 
regulating the relationships between organs, from producing solidarity, and so 
perpetuates a state of anomie.  
One of Durkheim’s most famous passages about anomie is found in the second 
preface of the Division of Labor in Society (1893/1984) where Durkheim writes: 
It is the state of anomie that, as we shall show, must be attributed the 
continually recurring conflicts and disorders of every kind which the 
economic world affords so sorry a spectacle. For, since nothing restrains the 
forces present from reacting together, or prescribes limits for them that they 
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are obliged to respect, they tend to grow beyond all bounds, each clashing 
with the other, each warding off and weakening the other…Men’s passions 
are only stayed by a moral presence they respect. If all authority of this kind is 
lacking, it is the law of the strongest that rules” (xxxii-iii).  
 
Durkheim’s discussion of economic anomie is much more nuanced than the 
vulgar translation of “normlessness.” He describes economic anomie as a collective state 
of limitless desire, where the absence of a moral authority that commands respect 
reinstitutes that most primitive system of morality – the law of the strongest. On the 
relationship between society and individual desires Durkheim wrote, “society is not only 
something attracting the sentiments and activities of individuals…it is also a power 
controlling them” (Durkheim, 1897/1951, p. 241). Put differently, society is responsible 
for constraining the individual will, but it is the relaxing of these restraints on individual 
egoistic desires that characterizes anomie.   
Four years after the publication of the Division of Labor in Society (1893), 
Durkheim again took up the topic of anomie in his book Suicide (1897). As noted 
previously, Andre Lalande observes that it was in Suicide that Durkheim offered his only 
synonym for anomie, “L’etat de dereglement ou d’anomie” Le Suicide, p. 281 (Lalande, 
1926/1980: p. 61).3 Having discussed the etymology of anomie, and, having pointed out 
that Durkheim was sensitive to the collective definitions of words, we move to discuss 
Durkheim’s understanding of anomie as dérèglement. Dérèglement does not have an 
equivalent synonym in English, mainly because it implies “immorality and suffering, but 
it is perhaps best translated as derangement” (Mestrovic, 1988, p. 62)4. The translations 
of anomie as normlessness or deregulation are overly secular, and are otherwise at odds 
with the etymology of both anomie and déreglément, which I have illustrated. Mestrovic 
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noted the importance of the influence from theology when he wrote, “the French poet 
Rimbaud used dérèglement to refer to a general kind of disordering. Anomie as 
dérèglement implies a condition of madness or a state akin to sin” (Mestrovic, 1988, p. 
62). The Littré Dicionnaire de la langue francaise – the French equivalent of the Oxford 
English Dictionary- cited derangement as the primary meaning of dérèglement: 
Dérèglement, dérangement are words expressing two nuances of moral 
disorder: What is dérangé is disarranged [hors de son rang] or is without 
place. What is déreglé is out of rule [hors de la règle]. The state of 
dérèglement is more serious than that of derangement (1863/1963, vol. 2, p. 
1672).  
 
 Circling back to our earlier discussion about The Division of Labor in Society 
where Durkheim quipped, “If they (the various academic disciplines) therefore form a 
whole lacking in unity, it is not because there is no adequate view of their similarities, it 
is because they are not organized,” in other words, they are dérangé or disarranged 
(1893/1984, p. 304). A few sentences later, Durkheim captures the other half of his 
definition of anomie, “If the division of labor does not produce solidarity it is because 
the relationships between organs are not regulated [déreglé]; it is because they are in a 
state of anomie, that is, is déreglé or out of rule (1893/1984, p. 304). Note that 
Durkheim’s use of déreglé was mistranslated as “not regulated.” Accordingly, we see 
that Durkheim’s conception of anomie did not change between his publication of The 
Division of Labor in Society (1893) and Suicide (1897). 
Up until this point I have linked the Christian writings about sin to the Ancient 
Greek writings on the grounds that the principle of dispensation, law, and hubris can be 
correlated with the division of labor, rule, and egoism, respectively. The Greek and 
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Christian writings on anomie do not give preference to a particular social class, a move 
that we see echoed in Durkheim. In Socialism and Saint Simon (1897) Durkheim 
criticized Marx for giving preference to the suffering of the proletariat: 
The malaise from which we are suffering is not rooted in any particular class; 
it is general over the whole of society. It attacks employers as well as workers, 
although it manifests itself in different forms in both: as a disturbing, painful 
agitation for the capitalist, as discontent and irritation for the proletariat. Thus, 
the problem reaches infinitely beyond the material interests of the two classes 
concerned…[one should] address, not those feelings of anger that the less-
favored class harbors against the other, but feelings of pity for society, which 
is suffering in all classes and in all its organs (Durkheim, 1897/1986, p. 143). 
 
Durkheim’s focus on suffering that is caused by anomie closely mirrors the 
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. According to André Lalande (1960, p. 23) 
Durkheim’s students nicknamed him “Schopen” because he was so enamored with 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a German 
philosopher and an influential figure in the fin de siècle of which Durkheim was a part. 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy centered around “the will” and its relation to suffering which 
he described as: 
[T]his striving that constitutes kernel and in-itself of everything, as the same 
thing that in us, where it manifest itself most distinctly in the light of the 
fullest consciousness is called will…It always strives because striving is its 
sole nature, to which no attained goal can put an end. Such striving is 
therefore incapable of final satisfaction; it can be checked only by hindrance, 
but in itself it goes on for ever (Schopenhauer, 1818, p. 308-309). 
 
In his description of the relationship between desire, willing, striving, constraint 
and suffering Schopenhauer was especially concerned with the suffering brought on by 
the will’s nature writing: 
We call its [the will’s] hindrance through an obstacle placed between it and its 
temporary goal, suffering…For all striving spring from want or deficiency, 
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from dissatisfaction with one’s own state or condition…No satisfaction, 
however, is lasting; on the contrary, it is always merely the starting-point of a 
fresh striving (Schopenhauer, 1818, p. 308-309) 
 
Schopenhauer’s depiction of the relationship between limits and suffering closely 
mirrors a passage from Suicide, where Durkheim discusses how unlimited desires cannot 
be satisfied and only produce new desires: 
It has been claimed, indeed, that human activity naturally aspires beyond 
assignable limits and sets itself unattainable goals…However, one does not 
advance when one walks toward no goal, or-which is the same thing- when his 
goal is infinity….To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to 
condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness…[T]he more one has, the 
more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling 
needs (Durkheim, 18971/1951, p. 247-248). 
 
This idea of insatiable desire, which has been linked back to Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, was essential to Durkheim’s conception of anomie. As we have already 
stated, Durkheim’s only synonym for anomie was déreglément, and, following the 
etymology of the word, that which is déréglé is without rule. In his neglected 
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (1950), Durkheim argues, “To the extent that the 
individual is left to his own devices and freed from all social constraint, he is unfettered 
too by all moral constraint” (p. 7). In the absence of external moral constraints, the 
insatiable will is unleashed prompting Durkheim’s observation: 
When there is no other aim but to outstrip constantly the point arrived at, how 
painful to be thrown back!...Since imagination is hungry for novelty, and 
ungoverned, it gropes at random…At least the horizon of the lower classes is 
limited by those above them, and for this same reason their desires are more 
modest. Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably 
lost in it, if no force restrains them” (1897/1951, p. 257). 
 
 It is interesting to note that Durkheim talks about how the insatiable will of the 
lower class is constrained by their economic circumstances even if they are not under the 
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sway of moral constraints. In contrast, the upper classes have “only empty space above” 
and so their desires “outstrip constantly the point arrived at,” that is, they are doomed to 
suffer. One cannot help but notice this passage’s affinity with the beatitudes as they 
appear in the Gospel of Luke: 
Blessed be ye poor: for yours is the kingdom of God. Blessed are ye that 
hunger now: for ye shall be filled. Blessed are ye that weep now: for ye shall 
laugh. Blessed are ye, when men shall hate you, and when they shall separate 
you from their company, and shall reproach you, and cast out your name as 
evil, for the Son of man's sake. Rejoice ye in that day, and leap for joy: for, 
behold, your reward is great in heaven: for in the like manner did their fathers 
unto the prophets. But woe unto you that are rich! for ye have received your 
consolation. Woe unto you that are full! for ye shall hunger. Woe unto you 
that laugh now! for ye shall mourn and weep. Woe unto you, when all men 
shall speak well of you! for so did their fathers to the false prophets (Luke 6: 
20-26, King James Version).  
 
 Luke’s four beatitudes are immediately followed by his four woes. The poor, the 
hungry, the sad, and those who are persecuted for God’s sake will all receive their just 
reward in heaven while the rich, the full, the happy, and those who are well spoken of 
have already received their just reward, meaning they are destined to suffer. Indeed, the 
society subjected to the deranged principle of dispensation-to the anomic division of 
labor-has severed social constraints and so is severed from morality, ignorant of justice, 
and suffering in all of its organs. It is on this ground that Durkheim stakes his claim that 
anomie takes many forms among them moral, economic, conjugal, intellectual, religious, 
and political.  
If the reader is still skeptical of Durkheim’s ties to the Christian philosophy of 
the Middle Ages and the Philosophy of Ancient Greece, we might remind them that the 
Middle Ages were regarded with horror by the Humanists of the Renaissance, while 
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Durkheim regarded the Renaissance as an extended period of anomie (Mestrovic, 1989, 
p. 79). In The Evolution of Education Thought (1938/1977), Durkheim notes that the 
Protestant Reformation was the catalyst for the reestablishment of equilibrium between 
the poles of homo duplex which the Renaissance had so skewed. Durkheim viewed the 
Jesuit Counter-Reformation in this context as well, despite the fact that the reformations 
seem to be pulling in differing directions. Mestrovic (1988) notes, “If early Catholicism 
resulted in anomie of the Renaissance because it took man too seriously, Protestantism 
leads to the modern anomie of pragmatism because it takes the world too seriously” (p. 
80). Thus, anomie is not conceived as excessive willing in a particular direction, either 
towards empiricism or sophism, but rather a general state of excessive willing brought 
about by the derangement of the division of labor. With that in mind, I move to 
contemporary interpretations of anomie. 
Contemporary Depictions of Anomie 
The earliest modern interpretations of anomie are to be found in the works of 
Talcott Parsons who wrote, “[a]nomie is precisely this state of disorganization where the 
hold of norms over individual conduct has broken down” (1937, p. 377) and “the 
breakdown of this [normative] control is anomie or war of all against all” (Parsons, 
1937, p. 407). Parsons’ student, Robert Merton, sticks fairly closely to the definition put 
forth by his teacher when he defines anomie as “a condition of relative normlessness in a 
society or group (Merton, 1957, p. 161). LaCapra (1972, p. 159) defines anomie as “a 
state of complete normlessness and meaninglessness of experience attendant upon 
institutional and moral breakdown.” Dohrenwend (1959, p. 472) took a slightly different 
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stance arguing that anomie was the “absence of norms altogether.” Some of the more 
logical theorists argued that there could never be a total lack of norms, but that anomie 
was characterized by “contradictory normative standards with which the actor must 
contend” (Dudley, 1978, p. 107; see also Marks, 1979; Willis, 1982). None of the above 
theorists quote Durkheim to support their interpretation of anomie (Mestrovic, 1985, p. 
120). The empty and confused conceptualization of anomie by these theorists has 
nothing in common with the “deranged” state of anomie with which Durkheim was so 
concerned. These representations of anomie as absence and meaninglessness imply 
emptiness or nothingness, while Durkheim’s anomic society is drowning in desire, 
overflowing with agitation, and steeped in suffering. We continue our journey having 
trampled the overly secular and shallow understandings of anomie as “normlessness” 
which have no parallels in Durkheim’s writings, and so have been found wanting. 
Another modern approach to anomie asserts that people are “not uni-dimensional at the 
mercy of collective control but that they are dualistic” (Mestrovic, 1985, p. 121). 
Durkheim’s biographer, Steven Lukes, believes this to be “the keystone of Durkheim’s 
entire system of thought” (1972, p. 22). From this perspective, anomie appears as a 
struggle between society’s obligations, frameworks, and goals and the individual’s 
autonomy (p. 23-24). Both Lukes (1972) and Giddens (1976) fail to follow this path 
because they believe that Durkheim contradicted himself by simultaneously advocating 
individualism, understood here as the cult of the individual, while also comparing 
individualism to egoism. (Mestrovic, p. 121). For Durkheim, the cult of the individual 
was a “collective representation-a social force that compels us to respect individual 
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rights and dignity- and an individual phenomenon, egoism, will, something like Freud’s 
narcissism” (Mestrovic, 1988, p. 55). Durkheim’s criticism of Guyau, discussed earlier 
in this work, stemmed from Guyau elevating the individual’s will, their egoism, to the 
place of moral authority. Individualism, the cult of the individual, restrains the egoistic 
will and constrains all person to “respect individual rights and dignity.” One can now see 
that there is no contradiction in Durkheim’s thought, as his understanding of anomie 
rested on the collective representation of individualism opposing the egoism, the will, of 
the individual. 
Social Integration, Solidarity, and Durkheim’s Conception of Suicide  
The final piece of the puzzle that is anomie is its relationship to suicide. 
Durkheim claimed that “suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the 
social groups of which the individual forms a part” (Durkheim, 1897/1951, p. 209) as 
well as “insufficient individuation has the same effects [people commit suicide] when 
social integration is too strong” (Durkheim, 1897/1951, 217). It may seem a bit curious 
that suicide might vary inversely and proportionally to social integration, as Maris 
writes:  
The suicide rate cannot vary indirectly and directly with social integration at 
the same time. Being a great man, Durkheim realized this and put his 
comments on fatalism in a footnote, apparently hoping that his rather obvious 
contradiction would be overlooked (1969, p. 12-13).  
 
However, the contradiction is only obvious if integration is taken to be inherently 
good, an assumption that has plagued sociology for quite some time (Mestrovic, 1989, 
p.117) However, if one casts off this assumption, and think about our daily lives, one 
may think of many examples where too much of something that is usually good becomes 
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very bad – long phone calls from loved ones when we are trying to meet a deadline at 
work for example. Indeed, the issue at hand does not stem from Durkheim himself, but 
from the interpretations and assumptions of his work. It is not just the assumption, which 
Durkheim did not share, that integration is always an unqualified good, but the use of the 
phrase “social integration” in general. Indeed it may have been less confusing to his 
readers had Durkheim substituted solidarity, one of the central themes of the Division of 
Labor, for “social integration.” The suicide which Durkheim argued varies inversely to 
social solidarity is egoistic suicide. 
 Durkheim was very critical of egoism, which I have already compared to 
Freud’s narcissism, and believed it to be a force in need of social constraint. Recall the 
theoretical genealogy of egoism that we sketched earlier in this paper – Greek hubris 
becomes the Christian pride, which gives way to egoism – and how egoism elevates the 
individual, isolating them in the process, and severing them for the solidarity of the 
group. As Durkheim put it: 
Through the very fact that these superior forms of human activity have a 
collective origin, they have a collective purpose. As they derive from society 
they have reference to it; rather they are society itself reincarnated and 
individualized in each one of us. But for them to have a raison d’etre in our 
eyes, the purpose they envisage must be one not indifferent to us. We can 
cling to these forms of human activity only to the degree that we cling to 
society itself (Durkheim, 1897/1951, p. 212). 
 
  Recall too, the division of labor is the source of solidarity because it produces 
interdependent organs that compose an organism: society. In this way, the suicide rate 
increases as solidarity weakens, as the individual feels himself to be outside of the 
solidarity, he loses his ability to feel his need for others and for others to feel their need 
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for him. Bearing this in mind, it seems quite logical that suicide would vary inversely 
with the degree of integration (solidarity).  
How then does it follow that the suicide rate should also vary proportionally to 
social solidarity? Durkheim calls “altruistic” those suicides that are the result of duty 
saying: 
Now when a person kills himself, in all these cases, it is not because he 
assumes the right to do so but, on the contrary, because it is his duty…the 
weight of society is brought to bear on him to lead him to destroy himself…it 
[society] compels and is the author of conditions and circumstances making 
this obligation coercive. This sacrifice then is imposed by society for social 
ends…this is because so strict an interdependence between followers and 
chiefs, officers and kings, is involved in the constitution of society that any 
thought of separation is out of the question” (Durkheim, 1897/1951, p. 219-
220). 
 
Altruistic suicide then, is a sacrifice to society by society. The willingness to 
sacrifice one’s life for another is not an individual motivation, but a social one. If this 
were not the case, soldiers would not be apt to throw themselves on top of grenades, 
march into oncoming gunfire, or otherwise put themselves in danger for the good of 
another. With this example in mind, one cannot be so quick to throw out mechanical 
solidarity as a thing of the past, for it continues to survive in modern times, but only 
those who have eyes to see with notice it. The demarcation of the individuals cannot be 
but very minor if society possesses such coercive power over them that it might demand 
they impale themselves on the spear of duty. It might be argued that altruistic suicide is 
the result of centripetal forces overpowering centrifugal forces, while egoistic suicide 
indicates that the centrifugal forces have overpowered their centripetal counterparts. 
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Either way, one can be certain that anomic suicide is different from the egoistic and 
altruistic types of suicide discussed here.  
Barclay Johnson (1967) argued that “altruism and fatalism really do not belong 
in Durkheim’s scheme, and that egoism and anomie are identical” (p.875). Johnson 
apparently misunderstands Durkheim’s conception of egoism and anomie. Durkheim 
understood egoistic suicide as resulting from an absence of solidarity, not from the 
derangement of moral rules. In contrast, anomic suicide is the preeminent form of 
suicide in anomic societies where the “rules themselves are the cause of the evil” 
(Durkheim, 1893/1933, p. 374). Yet, how can rules be the cause of the problem? For that 
answer I return to Durkheim: 
The passion for infinity is commonly presented as a mark of moral distinction, 
even though it cannot appear except in deranged consciences which establish 
as a rule the derangement from which they suffer…since this disorder is at its 
apex in the economic world, it has the most victims there” (Durkheim, 
1897/1983, p. 283).  
 
 Durkheim singles out the economic sector, with its endless pursuit of profit, as 
establishing derangement as a rule. However, derangement cannot be established as a 
rule unless there is solidarity within the group. This is yet another instance where 
Durkheim refuted the optimistic assumption that solidarity is an unqualified good. 
Perhaps an equally clear example of derangement as a rule would be the endless drive to 
be successful. If success is money, there is always more money to be had; if it is a great 
education, there is always someone who has a better education; if it is athletic 
achievements, there are always those who are more athletic and who win more awards. 
Without clearly defined limits, the limitlessness of success becomes a horizon that 
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stretches on forever. What’s more, unlike the pursuit of profit, the pursuit of success can 
be undertaken from a very early age.  
To illustrate the complexity and scope of Durkheim’s argument, I wish to 
consider the case study on adolescent suicide that was performed by Mueller and 
Abrutyn (2016) and published in American Sociological Review. It may seem strange to 
have an extended case study about adolescent suicide in a work about food, but its 
inclusion is essential for its missteps allow me to highlight covert assumptions of the 
authors that have come before me and the readers who come after. 
First, one must recall Durkheim’s reasoning for why suicide is essentially a male 
phenomenon: “If women kill themselves much less than men, it is because they are 
much less involved than men in collective existence; thus they feel its influence – good 
or evil – less strongly” (1897/1951, p. 299). If one extends this idea further, it might said 
that higher suicide rates reflect a greater role in collective existence, that is, greater 
exposure to the forces that animate the collective. In Mueller and Abrutyn’s case study, 
adolescents from a small tight-knit community are the ones committing suicide. 
Following Durkheim’s logic, one may conclude that the adolescents are the ones who 
are most involved in collective existence. This idea becomes more complex when one 
considers that the parents in this town are trying to live vicariously through their 
children. As Mueller and Abrutyn noted: “Many youths and parents reported, whether 
objectively true or not, that parents live through their children; thus a child’s failure 
or success is experienced as reflecting strongly on the parents.” (2016, p. 10). Yet if 
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the child’s failure reflected so strongly on the parent, why is the parent not the one to 
commit suicide out of a sense of shame or a sense of duty?  
Mestrovic (1989) provided us with a clue when he wrote, “Urban life is 
characterized, in general, by a quantitatively high degree of social contacts but a 
qualitatively low degree of social bonds…Social contacts are generally a source of 
stress because they multiply the chances for hurt, disappointment, humiliation and 
the like” (p. 120-121). In my case study, the children have many social contacts but 
few social bonds. Perhaps more problematic, the formation of additional social 
contacts is championed over the formation of social bonds. This quote from a female 
young adult in Poplar Grove describes the deranged obsession with success that 
adolescents grow up embedded in:  
The more [advanced placement (AP)] courses you take the better, the more 
sports you’re involved with the better; the more trophies in your bedroom, the 
better; Oh it’s classroom registration time. How many APs are you taking next 
semester? Oh, it’s sports transition time, what team are you joining next 
semester? Oh your team went to the championships, did you place first? What 
position did you play?” (Mueller & Abrutyn, 2016, p.11) 
 
This obsession with the limitless, the infinite pursuit of success, is an 
indicator of the deranged nature of the Poplar Grove community. Furthermore, the 
desire of parents to live vicariously through their children deranges the bond between 
child and parent, and makes it more of a social contact. Thus, the child’s failure is 
refracted through the parent, through the community, and back into the child who is 
left to deal with this failure by themselves. Normally, social bonds will help insulate 
the potential suicide from this suffering, but the issue of derangement is magnified 
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since forming social bonds is not highly valued, nor is seeking help in the Poplar 
Grove community (Mueller & Abrutyn, p.13-14). How might one describe the state 
of the adolescents in our case study? To quote Durkheim’s student Maurice 
Halbwachs, “All of the collective sadness and melancholy becomes embodied in him 
and rises through him to a higher awareness of itself” (1930/1978, p. 302). This is not 
excessive regulation or excessive integration, but a derangement of the division of 
labor between children and parents. The children likely do not want their parents to 
live vicariously through them, but that is the deranged rule, and the suffering that 
results is felt most keenly by the adolescent who is the most involved participant in 
the social life of the community. 
 The relationship between suicide and the potency of the collective sadness 
and melancholy was illustrated by Halbwachs as follows, “We can assume that the 
number of suicides is a rather exact indicator of the amount of suffering, malaise, 
disequilibrium, and sadness which exists or is produced in a group” (Ibid p. 314). 
One might then argue that these high suicide rates, which I have labeled as deranged 
or anomic, indicate an immense collective suffering, which takes up residence in the 
most active member of social life in Poplar Grove, the adolescents. The topic of 
suffering and its expression in group settings is a major topic of concern for this 
study, one which will receive a greater treatment in successive chapters. For now, I 
will content myself to say that while group can help insulate individuals from 
sufferings, they can also be the source of said suffering.  
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By now it has become obvious that anomie is a complicated concept, wrought 
with misunderstandings, which I have taken great pains to clarify. Nonetheless, it is a 
concept that is of fundamental importance to this work and, consequently, must be 
specified as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, I will use the term 
derangement and its derivatives to express what Durkheim meant by anomie in 
subsequent sections of this work. I make this designation out of necessity, since any 
modern day use of the term is met with the biases stemming from Parsons and 
Merton and spread far and wide by that most insidious of vested interests – the 
textbook press. I have endeavored to elucidate that anomie is not normlessness, nor a 
confusion of norms, but a state of derangement which afflicts our rules and relations. 
The equation of anomie and egoism, which Johnson seeks to make, falls far short on the 
grounds that egoism is the individual transcending moral rules while anomie is the 
implementation of immoral rules. These rules need not be prescriptive, for their 
immorality is tied to their destruction of moral constraints and so to the result they have 
on individuals and society at large. The problems raised by rules “that are a lack of rule,” 
as described by Durkheim, have not been the been the topic of much investigation, most 
likely owning to the misconceptions of Durkheim that are, and have been, fashionable. 
This study seeks to address these questions using food as a vehicle for analysis and 
reflection. The value of this investigation lies in its ability to navigate social theory and 
food studies simultaneously, drawing attention to issues in one by highlights answers 
posed by the other. With this in mind, I move to discuss some of the prevailing 
approaches to the study of food.  
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Food for Thought: Food and Social Theory 
 This work is driven by social theory, but the vehicle for this discussion is food. 
The previous section on derangement and its many misunderstandings was of supreme 
importance to this project, and what’s more, necessary to foreshadow this section on the 
primary approaches to studying food.  
Prior to sociologists entering the realm of food studies, most studies of food were 
either anthropological or economic. Mennell et al. (1992), Murcott (1988), and Whit 
(1995) all critiqued and reviewed the various anthropological approaches to studying 
food and, as such, I do not feel the need to critique them all here. That being said, I do 
feel that I must at least comment on the work of Claude Fischler because of his use of 
the term “gastro-anomie” which must be discussed in light of my previous comments on 
anomie. 
 It was Fischler who offered us the “omnivore’s paradox” and its derivative, the 
“omnivore’s anxiety.” According to Fischler, “unlike specialized eaters, an omnivore has 
the invaluable ability to thrive on a multitude of foodstuffs and diets and so adapts to 
changes in its environment” (Fischler, 1988, p.277). Fischler develops the idea of the 
omnivore’s anxiety from its need for a diverse diet, writing, “the omnivore is inclined 
towards diversification…which can be vital to its survival; but, on the other hand, it has 
to be careful…any new unknown food is a potential danger” (Ibid, p. 278). Fischler is 
correct to highlight the adaptiveness of omnivoreness, but his limited conception of food 
restricts his theory and ultimately leads it astray. The starving herbivore can only hope to 
survive if it finds plant life to sustain itself, but the omnivore is always starving in some 
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way, always hungry, for its nutritional needs are only met by a diverse diet—and one can 
never have enough diversity. Fischler also coined the term “gastro-anomie” to designate 
the destructuration of the codes and structures that have governed eating habits. Here, 
too, Fischler falls into the trap set by Parsons and Merton for his main point is that there 
are no more food norms, which is to say, that we are normless. While I agree with 
Fischler that the changed in eating habits has been rapid, I do not believe that we are 
normless. In fact, this entire project hinges on the idea that the norms that govern the 
present food system are “deranged” as they promote what I am calling, “disorders of 
excessive willing.” I will address the differences between the absence of norms and the 
presence of deranged norms—rules that are lack of rules— in subsequent chapters. 
 While I make frequent use of Durkheim’s theory and his terminology, neither he, 
nor the other classical theorists had much to say about food. Mennell et al (1992) point 
out that Marx’s use of the term diet was in reference to political assembly. Marx’s 
benefactor and partner, Friedrich Engels, recorded information about the atrocious food 
quality consumed by the working class in England in his The Condition of the Working 
Class in England (1845). Yet, as Mennell et al. note, Engels’ observations are more 
secondary, and so set the standard for later researchers who talk about food to do so as 
part of a discussion of something like social inequality or racism, not as something to be 
studied on its own. 
 Durkheim’ inquiry into food was almost purely confined to its significance in 
totemic religion and, more broadly, with respect to the sacred and profane as he 
addressed them in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912). Herbert Spencer, of 
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whom Durkheim was largely critical, also made references to the religious functions of 
food, including the offering of food to the dead and the abstaining of food as part of the 
process of divination. Interestingly, Spencer observed that corpulence served as a marker 
of social status in China and in African women since it implied that a person was free 
from the obligation to work.  
Echoing Spencer’s studies of corpulence, the American sociologist Thorstein 
Veblen (1857-19) offered some insights into the nature of class distinctions in America 
in his Theory of the Leisure Class (1899). According to Veblen, “the custom of festive 
gatherings probably originated in motives of conviviality and religion but now also serve 
an invidious purpose (1899/1965, p. 65). The vocabulary Veblen designates for this 
invidious purpose includes conspicuous consumption, conspicuous waste, and 
conspicuous leisure. Veblen develops this conspicuous trinity in the context of food most 
fully in his example of intoxicants and narcotics, writing: 
From archaic times down through all the length of the patriarchal regime it has 
been the office of women to prepare and administer these luxuries, and it has 
been the prerequisite of the men of gentle birth and breeding to consume them. 
Drunkenness and other pathological consequences of the free use of stimulants 
therefore tend in their turn to become honorific (Ibid, p. 62). 
  
 Of the theorists widely considered to be “classical,” Simmel deals most directly 
with food in his essay The Sociology of the Meal (1910). Simmel, like Durkheim, begins 
with food’s utility for religious rights, but moves into a discussion of the significance of 
commensality, including who is included at the table and who is excluded. Simmel 
describes the importance of coordination in eating together, writing: 
We know that very primitive people did not eat at definite hours but 
anachronistically simply when someone was hungry. However, having meals 
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together leads at once to temporal regularity, for a given circle can only gather at 
a previously fixed hour— the first conquest of the naturalness of eating (1910: p. 
245).  
 
For Simmel, the meal is a form super-imposed onto our natural appetites, which 
are always stirring with us, and it is the business of meals to oppose these spontaneous 
appetites, for their satiation can only be had within its confines. 
Norbert Elias’ The Civilizing Process (1939) explains the development of 
manners among the secular upper classes dating back to the Middle Ages. As far as his 
interest in food, Elias is perhaps most famous for his discussion of table manners 
(1939/1978, p.70-108). Aside from his discussion of table manners as markers of social 
status, Elias offers us comparatively little in the way of food studied as food.  
In The Lonely Crowd (1950), David Riesman offers some particularly fruitful 
insights about American’s changing relationship with food. Riesman’s analysis is 
interesting because it draws attention to a shift in the symbolic meaning of food in the 
transition from inner-directed to other-directed society. Riesman describes the symbolic 
meaning of food to the inner-directed person as: 
[the inner-directed type] might use food for display with relatively standardized 
menus for company and for dining out; what was put on display was a choice cut 
of meat, an elegant table, and good solid cooking…Having the proper food was 
something one owed to one’s status, one’s claim to respectability (1950, p. 142) 
 
 Riesman contrasts this with the symbolic meaning of food in the life of the other-
directed character type, who puts on display 
His taste and not directly his wealth, respectability, cubic capacity, or caloric 
soundness…the other-directed person is…prepared for the search for marginal 
differentiation not only in what he sets before his guests but in how it is talked 
about with them (Ibid) 
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 Riesman’s characterization of the symbolic meaning of food in other-directed 
society foreshadows Bourdieu’s (1984) work on food in Distinction, and even 
anticipates Naccarato & Lebesco’s (2012) work on culinary capital as a specific type of 
capital that Americans use to signal their social status. Bourdieu’s theory, built upon 
Marx’s work on economic capital, investigates how “multiple forms of capital—
economic, cultural, social, and symbolic—circulate across the social field” (Naccarato & 
Lebesco, 2012, p. 2). Bourdieu contends that this process of capital circulation occurs in 
practice, since he argues that it is in practice that we “knit together structure and action, 
meaning and material conditions” (Calhoun & Sennett, 2007, p. 7). Naccarato & 
Lebesco, following Bourdieu’s lead, investigate individual food practices with a lens 
towards understanding how culinary capital is circulate through these food practices 
(Naccarato & Lebesco, 2012, p.2).  
  Social theory helps to inform what we see when we look at food, but food also 
helps us understand and critique social theory. Perhaps the most surprising omission 
from the literature is the absence of definitions about the most basic concept in the study 
of food, food itself. Some of this is by design as Fischler wrote, “while the functionalists 
looked at food, the structuralists examined cuisine” (1990, p.17). Still, it is surprising 
that highly regarded books like Tannahill’s Food in History (1973/1988), Johnston & 
Baumann’s Foodies (2010), Naccarato & Lebesco’s Culinary Capital (2012), DeSolier’s 
Food and the Self (2013), Julier’s Eating Together (2013), and Biltekoff’s Eating Right 
in America (2013) all abstain from offering a definition of food even through food 
occurs or is implied in all of the above titles. My insistence at the outset that food is 
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primarily will and only secondarily representation stands in stark relief of these studies 
that use the term food loosely – without ever considering the consequences of such a 
choice.  
Having reviewed the many collective representations concerning food, I have 
arrived at the inescapable fact that food is will and, as such, the will subsists wholly on 
itself. One may be tempted to pass over this statement and its attendant significance as 
mere reductionism, but this would be an error with three significant consequences. First, 
to ignore that all we eat is will is to forestall all discussions about our moral and immoral 
relationships to and with food on the grounds that food is something less than us. 
Second, it is to ignore the obvious examples of animals that attack and eat people 
especially predatory animals like crocodiles, lions, and tigers. Lastly, it would be to 
ignore the simultaneous adaptability of environments and the organisms that reside 
within them and the fragile nature of existence for all organism ranging from humans to 
blades of grass. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SETTING THE TABLE 
Methods 
 In my introduction, I addressed the importance of Schopenhauer’s influence on 
the fin de siècle at the end of the 19th century and his influence on Durkheim and Freud 
in particular. Yet Schopenhauer’s philosophy relies heavily on Plato, and as Mestrovic 
(1985) argued in his doctoral dissertation, Durkheim and Freud could be read as 
responding to Plato. This is to say, the use of Durkheim and Freud’s work necessarily 
engages the work of Schopenhauer and Plato, and consequently, the ideas found in each 
thinker’s writings bear the hallmarks of inheritance including similar conceptualizations 
and vocabularies.  
Many of the thinkers and ideas discussed herein have rarely been put into 
dialogue with one another, as such, this work seeks to place these thinkers in a dialogue 
with the main interlocutors being myself and Durkheim—although Plato, Freud, Weber, 
Riesman, and Mestrovic also participate as interlocutors. If multiple parties are to have a 
discussion they must have a topic to discuss. It follows that food will serve as my vehicle 
for discussion.  
In placing these thinkers in dialogue with one another in a common context, I 
seek to illuminate important parts of their thought that I believe have been neglected and 
misinterpreted. This requires more than comparison and contrast, it requires the use of 
  61 
hermeneutics6—the theory and method of understanding— applied not to religious 
texts7, but to the texts of several social theorists—Plato, Durkheim, Freud, Weber, 
Riesman, and Mestrovic—as well as to the writings of several food studies scholars and 
investigative journalists. In other words, my method is the hermeneutics of food and the 
hermeneutics of social theory. If I am to situate my study with the greater schemes of 
social theory and food studies, my understanding and use of hermeneutics requires 
further explanation. For this explanation, I turn to Friedrich Schleirmacher, who 
developed hermeneutics for the purpose of understanding texts, principally, the Bible.  
The German theologian, philosopher, and biblical scholar Friedrich 
Schleirmacher described hermeneutics as “the art of understanding.” I accept 
Schleirmacher’s premise, and in doing so, make understanding Durkheim and the other 
social theorists the first part of my study. To say my goal is to understand these authors 
is not the same as explicating, translating, or applying them. Rather, it entails an 
understanding of the historical period that the author wrote in as well as knowledge of 
the primary currents of thought during a given time period. In his The Hermeneutics: 
Outline of the 1819 Lectures, Schleirmacher wrote:  
one must first equate oneself with the author by objective and subjective 
reconstruction before applying the art. With objective reconstruction one 
proceeds through a knowledge of the language as the author used it…. With 
subjective reconstruction one proceeds through the knowledge of the author’s 
inner and outer life (Schleirmacher, 1819/1978, p. 10).  
 
                                                
6	  Friedrich Schleirmacher is seen as the father of hermeneutics  
7 The field of hermeneutics is typically described as the method for understanding religious texts	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 Following Schleirmacher, I acquainted myself with Durkheim’s writings through 
enrollment in a course dedicated to reading his primary source works— as opposed to 
interpretations of this work—followed by a careful re-reading of his works with special 
attention paid to his use of anomie. These re-readings were an essential part of my 
method, as Schleirmacher wrote, “only from a reading of all of an author’s works can 
one become familiar with his vocabulary, his character, and his circumstances” (Ibid). 
The previous chapter on the origins of anomie was only possible after years of reading, 
since it was only after this period that I become capable of understanding Durkheim’s 
unique voice in Sociology.  
 Schleirmacher wrote that the practitioner of hermeneutics must be sensitive to the 
linguistic content (manifest) as well as the psychological content (latent) in a text. Put 
differently, the linguistic content of a text refers to what is common and shared in 
language, while the psychological content refers to the distinguishing features of a 
particular author’s work (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Durkheim is a 
particularly interesting author for hermeneutical analysis because he was keenly aware 
of the collective nature of language, writing, “a concept is not my concept; I hold it in 
common with other men…it is the work of a community (Durkheim, 1912/1965, p. 481).  
The art of understanding consists primarily in this sensitivity to the linguistic and 
the psychological content of the text. Nevertheless, this sensitivity cannot be cultivated 
except through exposure to the historical period—particularly its influences and 
problems—that a given author is working in. In describing this relationship, 
Schleirmacher wrote, “the vocabulary and the history of the period in which an author 
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works constitute the whole within which his texts must be understood with all their 
peculiarities” (Schleirmacher, 1819/1978, p.10).   
In my introduction, I noted Schopenhauer’s influence on the fin de siècle that 
Durkheim worked in and suggested that understanding Durkheim began with 
understanding the intellectual forces that were most potent in his milieu. Since 
Schopenhauer was an all-pervading influence, prior to beginning this project I read both 
volumes of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation (1818). This reading 
helped me understand why Durkheim was so concerned with limitless desire, he was 
responding to Schopenhauer’s influence on his milieu. The similarities in vocabulary 
and content indicate similarities in the linguistic content of Durkheim and Schopenhauer, 
which I illustrated through a comparison of quotations drawn from both authors on 
topics that they both addressed—desire, suicide, and the will to life to name a few. The 
psychological content of Schopenhauer’s work was his creative alliance of Plato and 
Buddhism to push the bounds of Kant’s philosophy into the realm of “the thing in itself.” 
The psychological content of Durkheim’s work cannot be divorced from his origins as 
the descendent of seven generations of rabbis. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Durkheim used anomie to refer to the secular equivalent of sin, which he used to 
describe a wide variety of immoral social phenomenon. Durkheim’s depiction of anomie 
as a state of immorality was derived from his usage of the term throughout his works, 
beginning with his critique of Jean Marie Guyau in which he wrote that the absence of 
all fixed moral rules could never be construed as a system of morality. The latent 
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meaning in all of his works, then, was a concern with immorality and sin in the context 
of social life.  
The texts that I employ are translations of the originals, which means they have 
already been interpreted in a sense because the translator had to decide what words to 
use when an English equivalent did not exist. While my work is indeed interpretive, I 
draw directly from the primary sources and utilize a large number of quotations to 
illustrate the consistent use of wording and ideas in each author’s works. 
There is one important exception, and that is the case of “anomie” in Durkheim’s 
work. Following Mestrovic and Brown (1985), my investigation of the anomie began 
with etymological research into the origin of the word in Ancient Greece. Then I 
combined this approach with hermeneutics to understand how it was used and in what 
contexts. As a result, I was able to distinguish anomie as “lack of rule” rather than the 
more literal translation of “lack of law.” More specifically, Durkheim’s use of anomie 
referred to rules that are lack of rules, that is, to rules that do not provide moral 
constraint and so are themselves the problem. The only synonym that Durkheim used for 
anomie is déreglément, which translates as “derangement.” Durkheim employed his 
concept of anomie to discuss economics as well as marriage, which is to say, he 
employed it to study tremendously different phenomenon. This makes it all the more 
puzzling that Parsons’ vulgar translation of anomie as normlessness could have caught 
on since marriage, of all things, is very much bound up with cultural norms and could 
never be described as “normless.” Thus, I contend that my hermeneutics of primary 
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source classical social theory, limited as it is by my use of translations, nonetheless 
improves on the understanding of all the theorists invoked. 
Bearing all this in mind, my project began by employing hermeneutics to 
understand Durkheim and Schopenhauer. Only after understanding them—the previous 
chapter was constructed with such care to illustrate this understanding— did I begin to 
discuss the other social theorists who form the corpus of this work. Only after shifting 
the contexts that these theorists are read in from Parsons/Hobbes to Plato/Schopenhauer, 
could I begin the second part of my project, the recontextualization and application of 
classical social theorists to the study of food.   
Having outlined my methods, I wish to outline the rest of this project for sake of 
clarity and consistency. This chapter continues with the origins and meanings of 
anomie—these were discussed in the previous chapter— as derangement is 
recontextualized with the goal of (1) extending Durkheim’s theory of derangement to 
modern society, (2) linking derangement to the practices of the food industry and the 
consumption industry in general. The next chapter, chapter 4, will apply (1) and (2) 
above to the problems introduced in chapter 1, including defining food and deranged 
food. Finally, chapter five will discuss the role of emotions in the modern food system. 
The sixth chapter will expand the ideas discussed in the previous chapters beyond the 
food system and will serve as my conclusion.   
Derangement in Modern Society 
 In the previous chapter, I took great pains to establish a genealogy of the term 
anomie from the Ancient Greeks all the way to Emile Durkheim. Nonetheless, it is still 
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fashionable in sociology to describe the term anomie as “normlessness,” so I continue 
my discussion using the only explicit synonym that Durkheim offered for anomie—
déreglément, which is translated into English as derangement. Derangement in English 
captures the disturbance in the normal functioning of an item or being, but it fails to 
capture the sense of immorality that accompanies the French déreglément. The deranged 
society has a forced division of labor governed by rules—used here to refer to norms, 
laws, customs, and habits—that are actually the absence of rules. Yet the absence of 
rules is not terribly worrisome unless one subscribes to the view that rules are necessary 
and, in their absence, life in common is either impossible or highly exploitative. The 
view that society is natural is an important attribute of this study. What I mean by 
“natural” is closer to what Darwin, Durkheim, Simmel, Tönnies and other thinkers from 
the late 19th century fin de siècle regarded as spontaneous versus the “state of nature” 
position taken by Hobbes and his followers—including Talcott Parsons.  
Consider what social life would look like if there was no strongest, no sense of 
obligation between members, and no common sentiments to bind them together. In other 
words, what is human nature? The answer given by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his 
writings on the state of nature8, was that it would result in a “war of all against all.” 
Parsons followed Hobbes’ depiction of the problem of social order and argued that social 
integration was the “consensus in society and the conflict between the individual and the 
larger consensus is understood as deviance” (Mestrovic 1985, p. 354).  
                                                
8	  See in particular Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651/1982)	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Against Hobbes and Parsons, and following Durkheim, I contend society is 
something natural, the spontaneous cooperation of a cosmic division of labor. 
Durkheim’s view of society as natural stands in contrast to three famed Western 
philosophers: Hobbes, Rousseau, and Montesquieu all of whom believed that “society is 
something that is added to nature” (Durkheim, (1892/1965), p.135-136). Mestrovic 
(1985) describes Durkheim’s position, writing: 
Durkheim specifically and explicitly rejected the assumptions of Hobbes on the 
same grounds that he criticized Rousseau, Montesquieu, Comte and a host of 
other thinkers, namely, that both the individual and collective levels of existence 
are equally natural (Mestrovic, 1985, p. 354).  
 
 Durkheim argued that society was natural and its residence within the individual 
was similarly natural, culminating in what he called the collective consciousness, or “the 
totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average member of society (Durkheim, 
1893/1984, p. 38-39). In referencing beliefs and sentiments Durkheim was referring to 
both ideas and emotions, since sentiments are to be understood as social bonds that are 
felt by the individual.  
It is worth pointing out Durkheim does not argue all such beliefs and sentiments 
are moral, hence, Durkheim leaves open the possibility that social bonds and the feelings 
they engender can be harmful to the individual. To this end, Durkheim prescribes the 
distinction of the normal from the pathological as a critical part of the sociological 
method9. The distinction between the normal and pathological are keystones throughout 
                                                
9	  Durkheim devotes an entire chapter in his Rules of the Sociological Method (1895) to the 
distinction of the normal from the pathological—from the deranged.	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Durkheim’s works, many of which, are actually included in this dissertation – the natural 
division of labor versus the forced division of labor being the most important in this 
project. Amazingly, one of the examples that Durkheim offers appears in Moral 
Education (19), as Durkheim writes, “With a certain amount of nourishment a normal 
man is no longer hungry: it is the bulimiac who cannot be satisfied” (p. 39).  Durkheim 
distinguishes between the normal person’s hunger with its fixed limit of nourishment 
and the pathological bulimic who gorges himself (excess will) and then quickly purges 
all of their acquired nourishment (excessive denial of the will). In contrast to the 
bulimic, the anorexic person does not consume enough nourishment, preferring to 
abstain from consumption as much as possible. Excessive willing, unconstrained by 
society, drives both the bulimic and the anorexic to deny the will to life, although the 
bulimic first overindulges the will to life by overeating and then forces themself to throw 
up. In both cases, the individual is driven by a pathological will to life.   
 In the following chapter (Chapter 4), I critique both definitions of food and their 
general absence from academic sources on the grounds that one must distinguish 
between the normal and pathological forms of food and consumption if one is truly to 
undertake a Durkheimian sociology of food.  
Modern sociology often regards all social bonds as good and helpful—the 
temptation to see all foods as nothing more than sources of energy is the same reductive 
thinking carried out in a different discipline— but Durkheim was more cautious noting 
that integration into a system with permissive rules was extremely painful for 
individuals, writing:  
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When there is no other aim but to outstrip constantly the point arrived at, how 
painful to be thrown back!...Since imagination is hungry for novelty, and 
ungoverned, it gropes at random (1897/1951, p. 257). 
 
The pain generated by ceaseless desire is a fixture of Durkheim’s thought 
stemming from the tremendous influence Schopenhauer had on Durkheim specifically, 
and the fin de siècle at the end of the 19th century in general (Magee 1983; Mestrovic 
1988). Schopenhauer describes the relationship between the will’s striving and pain, 
writing:  
[The will] always strives, because striving is its sole nature, to which no attained 
goal can put an end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final 
satisfaction.…[A]ll striving springs from want or deficiency, from dissatisfaction 
with one’s own state or condition, and is therefore suffering so long as it is not 
satisfied. No satisfaction, however, is lasting; on the contrary, it is always merely 
the starting point of a fresh striving. (Schopenhauer, [1818/1859] 1969, p. 308-
309).  
 
 Schopenhauer’s claim that ceaseless desire and striving towards infinity is the 
essential character of the will—which animates all phenomena—is recast by Durkheim 
in light of society’s moral prescriptions directed towards the infinite. Durkheim writes: 
The passion for infinity is commonly presented as a mark of moral distinction, 
even though it cannot appear except in deranged consciences which establish as a 
rule the derangement from which they suffer…since this disorder is at its apex in 
the economic world, it has the most victims there” (Durkheim, 1897/1983, p. 
283).  
 
 The passion for infinity is never moral, as the rules that do not have natural limits 
become a lack of rule. For Durkheim, morality consists precisely in the constraint of 
individual egoism, which is why he singles out the economic sector as a symptom, 
arguing that its ceaseless pursuit of more had come to be characteristic of social life at 
large, not simply the economic sector. Thus, Durkheim distinguishes between the 
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pathological desire for more profit, and the normal desire for profit that sets limits to 
itself. This dissertation purports to study “rules that are lack of rules” in the context of 
culture, economics, and politics. To this end, I advance the phrase “consumption 
industry” to refer to businesses engaged in the practice of getting people to ceaselessly 
consume10.  
The Consumption Industry and the Manipulation of Constraint 
The ceaseless striving of the will and its manifestation in social life leads one to 
the ceaseless pursuit of knowledge. The American Political Philosopher Allan Bloom 
offers food for thought on this topic, writing:  
The soul’s longing, its intolerable irritation under the constrains of the 
conditional and limited, may very well require encouragement at the outset. At 
all events, whatever the cause, our students have lost the practice of and the taste 
for reading. (Bloom, 1987, p. 62).  
 
Bloom asserts that the soul’s longing must be cultivated, implying that its 
longing is natural but in danger of being extinguished if not nurtured—in Bloom’s case 
by an education in the “great books”—by society. One must ask if Bloom is correct in 
asserting that the infinite longings must be stoked, after all, if the longings are truly 
infinite how can they diminish within the temporal limits of time and space? Durkheim 
also discusses the infinite longing to know that stirs the human soul, writing: 
But one might object that if one satisfies his hunger with a limited quantity of 
food, it does not follow that one can satiate his intellect with a determinate 
quantity of knowledge. This is a mistake….we cannot lead a more vigorous 
intellectual life than that which is compatible with the condition and over-all 
development of our central nervous system at that point in time. If we try to go 
                                                
10 Consume is used here in the broadest sense referring not just to literal consumption of food 
and drink but also to consumption of ideas and feelings.   
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beyond this limit, the foundation of our mental life will be disrupted, and, as a 
result, the mental life itself (Durkheim, p. 39). 
 
Durkheim contends that there are limits to our appetites for food and knowledge, 
these constraints are the natural extension of society within us. It seems more likely, 
then, to assert that the absence of infinite longings is bound up in students’ inability and 
distaste for reading. Drawing on Durkheim and Schopenhauer, Bloom’s depiction is 
particularly interesting since it implies a retreat from, or perhaps a denial of, the fervor 
that characterizes the will to life. 
However, these limits are viewed as obstacles to be overcome by the 
consumption industry. Indeed, ceaseless consumption requires that the limits on 
consumption be removed including financial, biological, and cultural constrains. Credit 
cards are perhaps the most obvious attempt to unleash egoism since they allow 
individuals to purchase things that they cannot actually afford. Credit, in general, 
deranges the traditional constraint played by financial means making it possible for 
almost every individual to gratify their desires even when they lack the financial 
capacity to do so. This is an essential feature of the consumption industry. 
Another traditional constraint that the consumption industry has worked to 
remove is the biological constrains on literal consumption, which is to say, the 
consumption of food. The food industry’s heavy investment in neurological research 
related to salt, sugar, and fat turned up several findings that the industry has employed to 
increase consumption of its products. In the 1970s a Boston Mathematician named 
Joseph Balintfy identified “the bliss point” in sugary foods, that is, the “precise amount 
of sweetness—no more, no less—that makes food and drinks most enjoyable” (Moss, 
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2013, p. 10). Using this information, the food technicians who worked for these large 
food companies were able to engineer processed foods that produced the most pleasant 
somatic symptoms in consumers.  
The discovery of the bliss point resulted in the consumption industry’s heavy 
reliance on sugar to exploit the body’s natural division of labor. However, sugar is not 
the only ingredient employed to derange biology, the food industry also makes extensive 
use of salt in its product formulations. The Monell Research Center published a paper in 
the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition (2012) that showed babies are born liking 
sweet tastes, but they naturally dislike salt. Babies that were fed baby food with low 
sodium or no sodium did not like the taste of the salty solutions created by the 
researchers. The babies who ate diets high in salt however, preferred the salty solution. 
The finding was startling, the deep love of salty food is the result of nurture, not nature.  
Moss (2013) argues that this finding points to a deeply troubling idea, namely, that the 
natural constraint against a diet high in sodium has been removed by the food industry, 
and the modern obsession with salty food is an artificially induced desire. More 
troubling still is the link between high sodium diets and high blood pressure, also known 
as hypertension. The increase in blood pressure has been correlated with increased rates 
of cardiovascular disease, which includes stroke, coronary heart disease, and heart 
failure.  
 In light of these companies’ efforts to trigger powerful somatic responses with 
their food products, it should come as little surprise that the large food companies refer 
to their best customers—the people who purchase and consume the highest volume of 
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their products—as “heavy users.” The tendency to describe consumers of processed 
foods using the same language as the consumers of drugs is another interesting finding 
of Moss’ excellent book on the food industry (Moss, 2013, p.282). While the language 
of addiction conjures up images of junkies robbing convenience stores to score enough 
money to buy some more drugs, it does not conjure images of people eating an entire 
package of Oreos. In spite of this difference, Moss describes a study—nicknamed 
“Crave It”— by neuropsychologist and mathematician Howard Moskowitz which found: 
people are drawn to foods that are heavily salty, sweet, or fatty for reasons other 
than hunger. They are drawn to these foods by emotional cues and the wish to 
avoid the lousy feelings the body generates as a way to defend against starvation 
(Moss, 2013, p. 278).  
 
The fear of hunger is deeply rooted in biology, including the biology of humans, 
which is why fasting is considered a pious act, since it is essentially the denial of the will 
to life. The food companies are aware of both the fear of hunger, and the linkage 
between piety and fasting, thus they produce many products designed to keep consumers 
full longer. Yet this is a direct contraction of the consumption industry, which thrives on 
continuous consumption and would be in danger if its products satiated consumers— as 
opposed to igniting their hungers and desires. Therefore, such labels should be viewed 
with suspicion since the ingredients are typically portrayed as healthy—whole grains are 
reported to keep consumers full longer—although the addition of high levels of salt, 
sugar, and fat to such products counteract the body’s natural response to such products. 
Indeed, the production and distribution of foods that actually made consumers full and 
limited their consumption are directly opposed to the aims of the consumption industry. 
If there was ever a conflict of interest in business, this is most assuredly it.  
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Having discussed the derangement of financial and biological constraints, I move 
to discuss the derangement of cultural constraints. The derangement of cultural 
constraints on consumption is a particularly difficult task in a country with deep 
Protestant roots. For now, I will only say that the consumption industry thrives on the 
exploitation of pre-packaged emotions. The work of the Frankfurt school—especially 
that of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse— noted the culture industry’s reliance on pre-
packaged ideas. However, Mestrovic (1997) notes that the Frankfurt school missed the 
role of prepackaged emotions. Prepackaged emotions, it might be theorized, produce 
prepackaged relationships between people, yet the emotions that are packaged are not 
virtuous emotions like the sense of duty, but more narcissistic emotions like apathy and 
jealousy. The constant emotional bombardment of the consumer, carried out by the 
consumption industry, blunts their emotion excitation, leaving a mass society that longs 
for nothing higher than immediate gratification.   
With the rise of the consumption industry, and its prerogative for constant 
consumption, modern people in the United States have lost the practice of cooking and 
their taste for engaging with their food. As one student told me bluntly, “I don’t want to 
wait for water to boil, I could spend that time doing something else.” To account for 
these changes I place the hermeneutics of food and the art of food in a dialogue with one 
another. This approach allows me to capture the ideas about food in modern America as 
well as the emotions attached to food.  
If one fails to take account of the ideas and the emotions attached to food, one 
cannot account for the emotionally laden practices of binge eating, bulimia, anorexia, 
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and gluttony all of which are better understood in the context of sublimating Eros. 
Ignoring Eros’ capacity for unity is a symptom of the Spencerian “survival of the fittest” 
perspective, which views social life as a zero sum game. However, if one accounts for 
Eros’ drive towards unity one arrives at the Darwinian perspective of cooperation 
between organisms, which reveals the additional benefits organisms accrue through 
cooperation including greater flourishing through specialization, increased 
interdependence, and a decrease in the intensity of the struggle for existence.  
 To illustrate the difference between the Spencerian and Darwinian studies of 
food and culture consider the social phenomenon of “the second shift.” Food studies 
scholars have been especially critical of women’s “second shift,” returning from work 
only to enter the kitchen and prepare a meal for their families (Hochschild & Machung, 
1989). Such studies tell us women are exploited by their husbands as well as patriarchal 
society at large, which they should resist by either forcing their husbands to cook or 
using their extra income to purchase meals out. Yet such studies ignore the very obvious 
fact that food has to get on the table somehow, and cooperation between family members 
would ease the difficulty of placing it there. If one family member is left to cook the 
meal on their own, it should be equally lucid that the other family members depend on 
said cook, and that the cook deserves their respect and gratitude. All members should, in 
a natural division of labor, feel their need for one another. The absence of these 
sentiments does not stem from a derangement of the relations between the sexes, but 
from the derangement of the relations throughout society. It follows, simply removing 
women from the kitchen is not a real solution, nor is replacing them with men, or 
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children for that matter. The real problem is the absence of the powerful sentiments and 
obligations which naturally form between individuals who cooperate with one another. 
To that end, the importance of emotional infrastructure in the food system will be 
expanded on in Chapter 5 as well as in the conclusion.  
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CHAPTER V 
FOOD: THE NORMAL & ABNORMAL FORMS  
The Problem with Indefinable Food 
From the outset this project hinges on advancing a different understanding of 
food than is common in mainstream American culture and mainstream academia alike. 
Searching through vast volumes on food— from historical texts to careful analyses of 
the nutritional components of food— turned up much less than I expected in terms of a 
working definition. The Routledge International Handbook of Food Studies (2013), 
Food: A Culinary History (1996), Food: The History of Taste (2007), Good to Eat 
(1985) as well as Reay Tannahill’s famous Food in History (1973) all spend hundreds of 
pages talking about the nuances of food and cuisine without ever pausing to define what 
food is. Books ranging from The Penguin Atlas of Food (2003) to What is America 
Eating? (1986)—a compilation of speeches from a symposium sponsored by the Food 
and Nutrition Board (FNB)— brought to the foreground a major problem, namely, 
definitions of food are actually quite difficult to find. For example, take this excerpt 
from a speech made by well-known dietician, Joan Gussow: 
In the thirty-four years I’ve been in the field of nutrition…I have watched real 
food disappear from large areas of the supermarket and from much of the rest of 
the eating world…[they are replaced by] products constructed largely around 
commerce and hope, supported by frighteningly little actual knowledge 
 
 Gussow criticizes the retreat of real food from large portions of the grocery store 
while simultaneously avoiding defining food and its opposite. One is left to ponder what 
these real foods are that disappeared and what exactly is left in the grocery store? 
Despite the gray area, strong claims like the one made above are the rule, rather than the 
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exception, when it comes to food criticism - regardless of discipline. The journalist 
Michael Pollan has written several books about food and the food industry, but despite 
the massive attention his books have garnered, neither The Omnivore’s Dilemma (2006) 
nor In Defense of Food (2008) offer their readers a straightforward definition of food. 
This is all the more troubling since Pollan offers advice as to what people should eat 
with the very first line of In Defense of Food writing, “Eat food. Not too much. Mostly 
Plants” (p. 1). Pollan’s In Defense of Food (2008) includes a chapter titled Eat Food: 
Food Defined, but it does not include an actual definition of food but a set of rules 
designed to help one eat food. The rules include: 
1.   Don’t eat anything your great grandmother wouldn’t recognize as food 
2.   Avoid food products containing ingredients that are  
a.   Unfamiliar 
b.   Unpronounceable 
c.   More than five in number, or that include 
d.   High-fructose corn syrup  
3.   Avoid food products that make health claims 
4.   Shop the peripheries of the supermarket and stay out of the middle 
5.   Get out of the supermarket whenever possible  
 
 Pollan’s rules are an admittedly good starting place but they fall short for several 
reasons. First, as one of my Professors pointed out, if your great grandmother was not 
knowledgeable about food, she would not be the right person to consult. Second, the 
natural food system is vast and avoiding ingredients that are unfamiliar reduces the 
diversity in the diet, and redirects the consumer to focus on pantry staples, which are 
perhaps even more likely to be deranged – a topic I will discuss in short order. Third, in 
advising consumers to “eat mostly plants” Pollan, perhaps inadvertently, levels all 
plants. From a nutrition perspective this is problematic since plants have wildly different 
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nutritional characteristics with plants like potatoes and sweet corn accounting for more 
calories, 110 and 90 calories respectively, than bell peppers and carrots, 25 and 30 
calories respectively. Moreover, potatoes are an excellent source of potassium (620 mg 
in a medium potato or 18% of the daily value), carbohydrates (26 g, 9% of the daily 
value), and even contain 45% of the recommended daily allowance of Vitamin C. One 
bell pepper contains 190% of the recommended daily allowance of Vitamin C, while one 
carrot contains 110% of the recommended daily allowance of Vitamin A. In other words, 
it is not sufficient to tell people they need to eat plants because the category -which 
includes fruits, vegetables, grains and legumes- is vast and eating a balance of these 
plants is key to obtaining essential proteins. But even this critique is marred by a serious 
problem, people don’t eat big sticks of vitamins and nutrients, they consume these in the 
form of food which makes stances like Pollan’s, and prescriptive rules in general, all the 
more problematic in light of the glaring absence of a definition of food from the 
discussion. Nonetheless, if I am to discuss deranged food in a meaningful way, I must 
advance some ideas about food that is not deranged.  
Food Defined 
 In her book Accounting for Taste (2004), Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson defines 
food as “the material substance we humans consume to meet the physiological 
requirements for sustenance; food is what we eat to live” (p. 3). Ferguson’s definition is 
grounded in biological need, but lacks clarity and utility since it only recognizes food as 
a material substance and biological necessity. As a result, Ferguson’s definition prevents 
her from distinguishing foods produced by nature and those produced at the expense of 
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nature, a dichotomy that I will take up in successive sections. The Merriam Webster 
Dictionary builds on this definition in a number of ways: 
1.   material consisting essentially of protein, carbohydrate, and fat used in the body 
of an organism to sustain growth, repair, and vital processes and to furnish 
energy; also: such food together with supplementary substances (as minerals, 
vitamins, and condiments)  
2.   inorganic substances absorbed by plants in gaseous form or in water solution 
3.   nutrient in solid form 
4.   something that nourishes, sustains, or supplies  
 
 The dictionary definition of food refracts some of the distinctions made by 
Ferguson, notably, the material state of food and its nourishing properties. The addition 
of protein, carbohydrates, and fat to the definition is a definite shift away from 
Ferguson’s definition, but further problematizes the already murky concept of food 
products. The problems beg two interrelated questions: Is the amalgamation of vitamins 
and minerals into a material form – powder, pill, bar—sufficient to sustain organic life? 
Is this amalgamation sufficient to sustain societies—understood in the context of plants, 
animals, and humans—or is there more to sustenance than biology? The answers to these 
questions require considerable clarification and cannot be answered apart from moral, 
cultural, and economic issues, which will be covered in the following sections. For now, 
I return to defining food and the main categories that authors have divided food into.  
The main identifiers that appear when defining food can be grouped together in 
their emphasis on physiology/sustenance and nutritional components (protein, carbs, fat 
and vitamins). The first definition contends that food only has sustaining properties and 
consequently either ignores or eliminates anything that people consume that makes them 
sick, or otherwise brings them infirmity rather than health. According to this definition, 
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anything that we consume that helps to prolong our life is food while anything that 
shortens our life must be its inverse – poison as it were. This definition has a strict 
utilitarian slant to it, and as a result, misses the obvious fact that food is also a great 
source of pleasure. Cultural food choices are rooted in both necessity and pleasure, as 
aversions to food differ from culture to culture, and reflect a culture’s aesthetics as well 
as its interdependence on nature.  
  The second definition views food as a composition of vitamin and mineral 
“organs” that produce energy in the form of calories for their consumer. The nutrients 
are the essential components of food, greater individually than as the sum of their 
collective parts. One problem with this definition is that it encourages people to view 
food as nothing more than calories and/or nutrient components. This problem is further 
exacerbated by fad diets that encourage people to consume a lot of a particular nutrient 
such as Atkin’s diet. The Paleo diet is especially problematic because it encourages 
people to eat like their Paleolithic ancestors, which sounds like good advice, but is next 
to impossible in light of USDA research that has demonstrated most meat, fruits, and 
vegetables sold in American supermarkets today possess considerably less nutrients than 
those produced before World War II11. Lastly, all these types of definitions ignore the 
                                                
11 The demands of industrial food distributors include long shelf life and durability in transport, 
two things which vary inversely with nutrient content. The vitamins and minerals that naturally 
occur in food are volatile compounds that lead to spoilage and rot, which lower profit margins 
for industrial producers and distributors. To offset this, much of modern food has been modified 
to increase its durability and shelf life and, subsequently, reducing the importance of the distance 
from farm to table. The cost of this shift is borne by consumers who now must eat more fruits 
and vegetables –which they do not want to do—and consequently more calories if they are to 
obtain the same amount of vitamins and minerals as consumers did prior to WWII.  
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vehicle for delivering these calories and vitamins, what is being consumed, for a more 
literal understanding of food that is more easily operationalized.  
Building on these definitions, I wish to advance a definition of food as something 
that sustains life, but does so through the utilization of the collective constituent 
elements (vitamins, minerals, calories) that naturally occur within a material substance. 
My insistence on the collectiveness of these elements is important, leading to the 
conclusion that the whole of any food is greater than the sum of its collective parts. To 
this end, vitamin supplements and isolated compounds are not food in the sense of the 
word as I will use it, but are better considered deranged food since they extract the 
vitamins and minerals that naturally occur in food with the aim of delivering an 
“unadulterated” supply to their consumer.  
Here one uncovers the first problem, the view of natural production of food as 
slow, encumbered, and adulterating the nutrients therein. In seeking to improve on this 
natural and spontaneous division of labor between all organic life, particular nutrients 
are elevated above others to the detriment of food and the food system – this is the 
essence of derangement. I take Durkheim’s insistence that the division of labor’s 
outcomes are very different when it is healthy versus when it was sick to be 
tremendously insightful and, consequently, draw a fine distinction between foods 
produced by and possessing a healthy division of labor and those that were not and do 
not. Describing the effects of the healthy division of labor, Durkheim writes: 
The most notable effect of the division of labour is not that it increases the 
productivity of the functions that are divided in this way, but that it links them 
very closely together. In all these cases its role is not simply to embellish or 
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improve existing societies, but to make possible societies which, without these 
functions, would not exist (1893/1984, p. 21).   
 
 In Durkheim’s example the division of labor links functions more closely 
together making new societies possible, not just improving the efficiency or grandeur of 
the old ones. Similarly, the division of labor links nutrients together, infuses them with a 
will to life, and produces new foods – foods not possible prior to the increased linkages 
between functions. The division of labor links all organisms together, humans included, 
in a phenomenon immortalized by The Lion King as “the circle of life.” These linkages 
engender mutual dependence among organisms—themselves all manifestations of 
Schopenhauer’s will to life—producing an ecosystem that begins as a moral community 
that encapsulates all organisms and, in turn, mutually modifies organisms into an 
ecosystem that eases the struggle for existence.  
One may object to this definition and criticize it as cumbersome, but I wish to 
illustrate how my definition contains the seeds of other definitions of food and plants 
them in more fertile soil. In The Real Food Revival (2005), Vinton and Espuelas 
describe ‘Real Food’ as “delicious, produced as locally as possible, sustainable, 
affordable, and accessible” (p. xiii).  One is tempted to immediately criticize the 
definition as largely subjective since what is delicious, affordable, and accessible is 
linked to the individual’s resources and personal preferences. However, in objecting to 
the specifics, one may miss the obvious whole – Real Food is a division of labor that 
includes all five attributes but is not reducible to any of these five. Vinton & Espuelas 
define real food by its essence, that is, by addressing those qualities that are irreducible. 
However, they stop short of explaining what that essence is and why the destruction of 
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that essence is morally dubious. In short, they see two mutually exclusive forms of the 
division of labor, one in the Real Food that makes it delicious, and the other in the realm 
of political economy that makes it difficult to obtain and distribute without harming the 
environment. The problem with this approach is it treats these divisions of labor as 
separate—one spontaneous and natural, the other forced and deranged— rather than 
bound up with one another. The result of a spontaneous division of labor that engenders 
mutual dependence is nutritional diversity (diverse nutrients), culinary diversity (diverse 
foods), and moral cohesion.  
There is perhaps no better exemplification of this idea than that of terroir. Justin 
Hughes, associate professor and director of the Intellectual Property Law Program at the 
Cardozo School of Law describes terroir in his article Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: 
The Spirited Debate about Geographical Indications (2006) writing: 
Terroir has no direct English translation, but the notion behind the Latinate word 
is simple: the product’s qualities ‘come with the territory.’ To put it less 
poetically, terroir is the idea of an ‘essential land/qualities nexus.’ This is the idea 
of terroir: that the particular geography produces particular characteristics that 
cannot be imitated in other regions (Hughes, 2006, p. 299). 
 
This bond between environment and food is captured beautifully by Larry 
Olmsted in his book Real Food Fake Food (2016) as he writes: 
The rare Royal Red shrimp, arguably the best-tasting shrimp in existence, has 
been found in only two locations worldwide, both deep water pockets off the 
eastern coast of the United State…Such plants and animals are Mother Nature’s 
way of reminding us that the world is varied and that not all places are the same. 
Ecosystems are amazingly complex, from climate, geography, and geology down 
to the insect and microbial level. This makes particular places better or worse 
than others at growing particular things (Olmstead, 2016, p.114).  
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In other words, terroir stems from ecosystems—themselves natural 
manifestations of the division of labor—which are formed spontaneously through the 
natural division of labor. Durkheim specifically outlines two conditions brought about 
by this natural division of labor that prevent derangement writing, “a state of anomie is 
impossible wherever organs solidly linked together are in sufficient contact and 
sufficiently lengthy contact (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 304).  The sufficient contact and 
sufficiently lengthy contact are powerful forces since they link the organisms in an 
ecosystem more tightly together, resulting in food with distinct properties that also bear 
the mark of a moral community. In this sense, terroir connotes an understanding of food 
that is more than the sum of its parts. It’s “realness” is the product of a moral community 
formed among organisms that have come to be interdependent on one another.  
In his summary of John Dewey’s famous essay The Reflect Arc Concept in 
Psychology, David Hildebrand describes Dewey’s criticism of the relationship between 
organisms and their environment writing, “the nature of organisms is to interact 
continuously with their environment in a manner that is cumulative and mutually 
modifying (Hildebrand, 2008, p.15). Dewey helps to illustrate that terroir is not 
something to aspire to, it is a happening that is always in process, the result of an infinite 
number of mutual modifications brought about by the division of labor. The idea of 
mutual modification is of extreme importance to this project and will appear in every 
chapter hereafter. The natural division of labor exerts influence that is mutually 
modifying, rather than unilaterally modifying, a distinction that helps to illuminate how 
both the food and the food system have become deranged.  
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One may argue that ecosystems are the products of this mutual modification, 
rather than their starting point, and contend the division of labor makes ecosystems 
possible. The mutual modification at the heart of the division of labor creates strong 
bonds between organisms. The strength of these bonds varies inversely with the diversity 
of the ecosystem so more diverse ecosystems are much more interdependent than 
ecosystems that possess a monoculture of a particular staple like wheat. Durkheim 
discusses the relationship between similarity and constraint in the conclusion of The 
Division of Labor in Society (1893/1984) writing: 
Thus if only those ties were forged that were based on similarities, the 
disappearance of the segmentary type of society would be accompanied by a 
steady decline in morality. Man would no longer be held adequately under 
control. He would no longer feel around him and above him that salutary 
pressure of society that moderates his egoism, making him a moral creature. This 
it is that constitutes the moral value of the division of labor. Through it the 
individual is once more made aware of his dependent state vis-à-vis society. It is 
from society that proceed those forces that hold him in check and keep him 
within bounds. In short, since the division of labor becomes the predominant 
source of social solidarity, at the same time it becomes the foundation of the 
moral order (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 333).  
 
Durkheim’s comments on morality based on sameness corresponds to an 
ecosystem with a forced division of labor. He cites Darwin’s writings on sameness and 
paraphrases them writing, “two organisms vie with each other more keenly the more 
alike they are. Having the same needs and pursuing the same purposes, they are 
everywhere to be found in a state of rivalry” (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 208). Such 
ecosystems result in poorer health for the organisms that inhabit them and the 
subsequent introduction of vast quantities of pesticides and antibiotics to prevent 
sickness. To this end, food produced in a forced division of labor is always of an inferior 
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quality in terms of its nutrients, its impact on the environment, and its relations with 
other organisms—including humans. Under such circumstances neither humanity nor 
plant life feels ‘salutary pressure’ and, consequently, both lapse into states of egoism at 
the expense of one another. The plant requires help if it is to spread its seed, a task 
performed by rain, wind, water, birds, insects and humanity. The human requires help 
from the food in the form of nourishment— food that is heavily medicated does not 
provide such nourishment—a task performed by the interdependence of the other 
organisms that live in proximity to the plant. Through their interdependence they work 
to keep one another in a state of health.  
One may question if my discussion of the division of labor, food, and morality is 
stretching Durkheim’s theory beyond its limits, nevertheless, there is a precedent in the 
literature for my approach. Durkheim’s teacher Alfred Espinas wrote a book on animal 
societies. Durkheim uses the works of Darwin to illustrate his idea of organic solidarity 
in The Division of Labor in Society (1893). It should be noted that Darwin never used the 
phrase “survival of the fittest,” for which he is so often given credit. Herbert Spencer, 
whom Durkheim despised and criticized voraciously throughout his works12, actually 
coined the phrase “survival of the fittest.” Darwin described biological organisms as 
engaged in a “struggle for existence,” that is to say, in a collective and open-ended 
struggle. Cooperation and interdependence among organisms engender mutually assured 
destruction, a key point that “survival of the fittest” not only fails to convey, but outright 
                                                
12 See especially The Division of Labor in Society (1893)  
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denies. Consider the following passage about Darwin’s theory in Park & Burgess’ 
famous book Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921)  
The formula "struggle for existence," familiar in human affairs, was used by 
Darwin in his interpretation of organic life, and he[Pg 514] showed that we gain 
clearness in our outlook on animate nature if we recognize there, in continual 
process, a struggle for existence not merely analogous to, but fundamentally the 
same as, that which goes on in human life…the phrase "struggle for existence" 
was meant to be a shorthand formula, summing up a vast variety of strife and 
endeavor, of thrust and parry, of action and reaction (Park & Burgess, 1921, p. 
514). 
 
 This important passage is expanded upon with a short, but extremely profound 
passage, just a few pages later: 
The term "struggle for existence" is used in a large and metaphorical sense, 
including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more 
important) not only the life of the individual but success in leaving progeny” 
(Park & Burgess, 1921,  p. 516).  
 
Having already noted the impact Darwin’s thought had on Durkheim, one can 
move to discuss how the unpacked definition of the struggle for existence is made 
manifest in Durkheim. Mestrovic describes the shift from Darwin to Durkheim, writing: 
It was a short step for Durkheim to draw upon Darwin’s insights and to conclude, 
in his classic book, The Division of Labor in Society (1893), that the struggle for 
existence within and among societies is ameliorated by the “cooperation” and the 
division of labor. Durkheim added that this cooperation or division of labor must 
be “spontaneous,” and he warned against the “forced division of labor”— which 
is dysfunctional (Mestrovic, 2012, p. 138). 
 
 Schopenhauer, whose influence on Durkheim was also noted by Mestrovic 
(1988a, 1988b, 1989), devotes considerable time to discussing morality in nature in his 
works The Will in Nature (1836) and The World as Will and Representation (1818). In 
fact, Schopenhauer’s discussion of will in plants and animals adds another dimension to 
this discussion since he claims that plants and animals do not possess the ability for 
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reflective consciousness and are instead composed entirely of will, and consequently 
pure egoism. One may ask if morality is possible between plants and animals given 
Schopenhauer’s conception? Schopenhauer’s believed it was and gave the example of 
the life cycle of a particular flower for illustration, writing: 
In the flowering season, the female flower of the dioecious Vallisneria unwinds 
the spiral thread of the stem that had been holding it at the bottom of the water, 
and uses it to rise to the surface. At just the same time, the male flower tears 
itself away from the short stem on which it had been growing at the bottom of the 
water, and so by sacrificing its life it reaches the surface and swims around 
looking for the female flower. Then, after pollination, the female contracts its 
spirals and withdraws back to the bottom where the fruit develops 
(Schopenhauer, 1818, p. 185). 
 
As I noted above, Durkheim described the relationship between social will and 
egoism writing, “He would no longer feel around him and above him that salutary 
pressure of society that moderates his egoism, making him a moral creature” (Durkheim, 
1893/1984, p.333). If the division of labor produces social pressure and, consequently, 
morally constrains individuals, then one might also say that the division of labor 
produces moral constraint among plants and animals through its pressures exerted in the 
form of a diverse ecosystem. Durkheim fully conceived this idea and described it in 
vivid detail, writing: 
Moreover, everyone has noticed that in the same field, beside cereal crops there 
can grow a very great number of weeds. The animals likewise do better in the 
struggle [for existence] the more they differ from one another. On an oak tree are 
to be found up to two hundred species of insects that have no contacts with one 
another save those of good neighborliness. Some feed on the fruits of the tree, 
others on leaves, yet more on bark and roots…in the same way, within an 
organism what lessens the rivalry between the different tissues is the fact that 
they feed on different substances (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 209). 
 From this quote and the prior discussion, one can underscore another important 
idea, namely, the procreation and survival of subsequent generations of a given organism 
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are bound up in the mutual dependence—moral cohesion—among organisms in an 
ecosystem. Such is the case of the male Black Widow Spider and the male Praying 
Mantis, both of which are consumed by the female shortly after completing mating. The 
will to life is therefore transferred from one generation to the next, a tiny ripple that 
permeates throughout the entire ecosystem. Larry Olmstead (2016) captures this point in 
the conclusion of his Real Food Fake Food writing: 
Like a stone tossed in a pond, deciding what to eat has a ripple effect …When 
you choose to eat Real Food, your immediate benefit is that it tastes good. Your 
long-term benefit is that it is almost always healthier. In many cases it is also 
more sustainable, healthier for the environment, and supports people whose 
work, methods, and entire communities make the world a better place (Olmstead, 
2016, p.276). 
 
The idea of food choice as a moral choice is a compelling one, not just in the 
sense of making food moral, but as an opportunity to participate in an already formed 
moral community. But what is this moral community? One may rightly point out 
“commensalism,” or symbiotic relationships between organisms, seems to imply that 
organisms are just living together rather than subsisting on one another. In addition, it 
might seem to ignore within-species variation producing better consumers since certain 
organisms possess a genetic mutation making them better suited to the task of 
consumption. I do not deny that organisms subsist on one another, nor do I ignore the 
charge of evolution producing more capable predators. However, in both cases there is 
an implicit relationship between organisms already place which is important for two 
reasons.  
First, evolution presupposes that a predator has evolved to be a better consumer 
of animals, while the prey has evolved to protect itself against its predators and to be a 
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better consumer of its food supply whether ant, plants, and other small animals. 
Successive generations of poison arrow frogs do not evolve more toxic poison unless 
another organism depends on them for sustenance. Second, the consumption of one 
organism by another is both moral and necessary when one understands a given 
ecosystem was formed through a relationship based on interdependence and mutual 
modification.  
Humans possess the ability to abstract from their sense perceptions and 
intuitions, an ability we do not share with plant and animals. As such, humans possess 
the ability to create abstract representations to illustrate intuitively understood “rules” at 
work in the animal kingdom, which include humans’ ability to represent their 
dependence on their food sources, their environment, and each other in abstract forms. It 
is important to note abstract representations run the risk of interfering or blocking the 
intuitive perceptions of humans and leading them to ignore the moral constraints 
naturally at work in their ecosystem. In this sense, human morality comes from 
recognizing our dependence on other organisms, the environment, and our need to 
sustain the moral relationships upon which our ecosystems were founded. To this end, 
humanity is not greater than the other organisms linked together in this ecosystem, but 
merely distinct organs that have their place and function. To this end, I use the term 
“food” to refer to the products of such an arrangement. Producers of deranged food, the 
topic of my next section, view food as something to be fixed, not as something holistic 
and possessing its own natural interrelations. One might note that this is a very 
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democratic view of food, since it topples any aristocratic pretenses that might suggest 
one part of the system matters more than another part.  
     Deranged Food  
 The result of a forced division of labor is unhealthy food and an unhealthy  
food system, but the issues pertaining to a deranged food system will be taken up in 
subsequent chapters. For now, I wish to focus on deranged food as an individual 
phenomenon. Michael Pollan succinctly summarizes the pervasiveness of this problem 
in his book In Defense of Food (2008) writing: 
And you’re better off eating whole fresh foods rather than processed food 
products. That’s what I mean by the recommendation to “eat food”…For while it 
used to be that food was all you could eat, today there are thousands of other 
edible foodlike substances in the supermarket. These novel products of food 
science often come in packages elaborately festooned with health claims, which 
brings me to another, somewhat counterintuitive, piece of advice: If you’re 
concerned about your health, you should probably avoid products that make 
health claims. Why? Because a health claim on a food product is a strong 
indication it’s not really food, and food is what you want to eat (Pollan, 2008, p. 
1-2). 
Pollan draws the distinction between whole fresh foods and processed food 
products, a distinction that needs some clarification. Pollan is building up to his rules for 
eating food, outlined earlier in this chapter, so he first establishes whole foods from 
processed food products. Processing food is difficult to define because it is difficult to 
advance a definition that doesn’t demonize foods that are not eaten straight from the 
ground or from the animal. This is problematic since products like cheese, especially 
parmesan reggiano, could be considered processed if the definition was too limiting in 
terms of the role that people played in producing it. Conversely, too loose a definition 
makes it so that Kraft American singles are considered cheese, when they are in fact a 
  93 
processed cheese product that has been tailored to increase its shelf life indefinitely – a 
process that drastically reduces the nutrients found therein.  
I will content myself to say that food has passed from prepared to processed 
when chemical compounds are isolated from their naturally occurring source and used to 
extend the shelf life or increase the appeal to customers. In this sense, bacon that is made 
by curing a pork belly with salt, sugar, and celery – which naturally contains the nitrites 
that are often replaced by sodium nitrate, or “pink salt”— is food that has been prepared 
with respect to the natural division of labor between all the ingredients. Similarly, most 
forms of pickles and preserves including those made with meat (jerky), fish (salt cod), 
fruit (jam, jelly, preserves, marmalade), and vegetables (pickles, kimchi, sauerkraut) are 
historically made with only a small handful of ingredients – salt, sugar, and spices. Only 
a handful of methods are employed in this regard such as salting, smoking, sun drying, 
boiling off impurities, and canning. On the other hand, beverages that have been fortified 
with extra vitamins and minerals are processed—by which I mean deranged—because 
their present state was achieved through manipulating their naturally occurring nutrients 
and mechanically changing the division of labor, an arrangement that had slowly come 
into being through a process of mutual modification over the course of thousands of 
years. The addition of vitamin d to milk and iodizing salt are good examples of deranged 
foods although both were deranged because of deficiencies within the average American 
diet. Iodized salt is particularly deranged since increasing one’s daily iodine intake with 
iodized salt simultaneously increase’s one’s intake of sodium. In summary, the primary 
characteristic of deranged food is the interference with and subsequent rearranging of the 
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natural division of labor found within the food itself. This involves destroying the 
linkages between the physical food and its nutrient components with the goal of isolating 
these components. 
To illustrate this practice and its many nuances, I will discuss the food 
technology company, Soylent. Following Durkheim, I contend that the removal of 
traditional constraints and their subsequent replacement with new rules that are lack of 
rules is to be characterized as derangement. To this end, Soylent is the quintessential 
example of the derangement of food as I will showcase from an analysis of its own 
website.  
Soylent’s website greets its visitors with a microcosm of the issues to be 
discussed in this chapter, “Food that frees you. We fuel our bodies every day, and often 
it feels like hard work. That seemed wrong, so we created Soylent.” The idea of being 
freed from food, is an interesting one since its consumption is common to all members 
of the human race as well as organic life on the whole. Rob Lyons (2011) noted,“[m]ost 
of the world’s population, for most of human history, has lived in a constant struggle to 
obtain enough food to survive and thrive” (p. 1). Lyons is correct, and his comments 
illuminate another important idea, that humanity has struggled for most of its history to 
get enough to eat and, by extension, expended much energy in pursuit of more energy. 
The modern “problem” of expending more calories than one consumes is the exception 
to the historical rule. To be freed from food would be to be freed from nature, perhaps 
even to have conquered nature.  
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The intersection of the struggles for freedom from nature and dominion over 
nature was of particular interest to Freud in his Civilization and its Discontents (1932). 
Regarding the origins of this dualistic struggle, I again turn to the story of Adam and Eve 
as a story that captures the intersection of these struggles and the concerns that underlie 
them. Adam and Eve had dominion over the Garden of Eden, but their desire for the 
fabled fruit was the first sin, the original sin as it were, humanity committed and it is has 
served as the prototype ever since. In the previous section on the origins of derangement, 
I discussed how St. Augustine characterized the sin of Adam and Eve as a sin committed 
first in their hearts and only second in the world of phenomena, that is, in the eating of 
the apple. The temptation of the serpent aroused the slumbering desire to conquer Eden – 
despite their present guardianship of it— and to usurp God and thus be free of his 
constraints. The story of Adam of Adam and Even points to a metaphysical truth, 
namely, whatever material difficulties—including environmental and social—one is 
confronted with, the simultaneous longing to escape these difficulties and to conqueror 
them leads us to harm ourselves and all of our relations. C.S. Lewis broadly describes 
this paradoxical relationship writing, “Man’s conquest of Nature will have brought about 
Nature’s conquest of Man: the Abolition of Man.”  
Humanity’s struggle against and over nature brings us to back to the 21st century 
and the food technology company known as Soylent. Soylent’s claim that it is hard to 
fuel our bodies is interesting one since, as omnivores, we possess more dietary autonomy 
than most species on the planet. However, as Fromm (1941) reminded humanity, 
freedom is something to be escaped and so one is confronted with the foodlike 
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substances produced by Soylent. In contrast to the vast diversity of what our diet could 
consist of in the 21st century, Soylent offers its products in the following forms: 
1.   Soylent Bars 
2.   Soylent Powders 
3.   Soylent Coffiest (a coffee like beverage) 
4.   Soylent Drinks 
a.   Original Flavor  
b.   Nectar Flavor   
c.   Cacao Flavor 
 
The idea of a cheap and portable meal is appealing to people who are on the go 
and who do not have time to meal prep during their busy work schedules. A bottled 
beverage or snack bar is an admittedly easy way to consume one’s daily nutritional 
requirements - one Soylent Drink contains 20% of these daily nutritional requirements. 
Soylent Drink is marketed as “engineered ingredient design,” which is an honest 
reflection of just what it is – engineered ingredients in a bottle – as opposed to what it is 
not, namely, food in the sense that I have used it. Soylent is not food because it is 
composed of a forced division of labor, nutrients specially selected for the benefits they 
extend to their consumers linked together by scientists in a laboratory. The bonds that 
held these nutrients components together in their naturally occurring sources had to be 
severed so they could be studied individually to better understand their effects. However, 
in their natural state their effects are never felt in the absence of the other nutrient 
components, thus studying nutrients as if they occur in a vacuum is deranged in itself 
while their implementation ignores the fact that the division of labor in the human body 
arose from mutually modifying processes and therefore cannot be understood in a 
unilateral manner. Soylent’s idea of tailored nutrition and subsequent description of 
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Soylent Drink as engineered ingredient design includes the tagline, “each ingredient in 
Soylent drink provides essential nutrition.” What are these essential nutrients? 
1.   Soy Protein – “Soy protein isolate provides a smooth texture and robust 
amino acid profile” (See Figure 1.) 
2.   Sunflower oil – “High oleic sunflower oil is a high-quality source of 
monounsaturated fats and contains no transfats.” (See Figure 2.) 
3.   Isomaltulose – “A slow metabolizing disaccharide synthesized from beets 
offers sustained energy without the spikes of refined sugar.” (See Figure 3.) 
4.   Vitamins and minerals – “Each bottle of Soylent Drink includes 20% daily 
requirements of all essential micronutrients.” (See Figure 4.) 
 
 
Figure 1. Soylent Depiction of Soy Protein Isolate 
 
 
Figure 2. Soylent Depiction of Sunflower Oil 
 
 
Figure 3. Soylent Depiction of Isomaltulose 
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Figure 4. Soylent Depiction of Vitamins and Minerals 
 
 Apparently essential nutrition consists of products derived from the things 
depicted in each figure with the notable exception of Figure 4., which conveys vitamins 
and minerals as a fine white powder. This exception is an important one since vitamins 
and minerals do not naturally occur as powders in nature, rather, their appearance in this 
form is the result of the derangement of their division of labor. Pollan (2008) describes 
the discovery of vitamins and their subsequent impact, writing: 
Clearly the chemists were missing something – some essential ingredients 
present in the fresh plant foods (like oranges and potatoes) that miraculously 
cured the sailors. This led to the discovery early in the twentieth century of the 
first set of micronutrients, which the Polish biochemist Casimir 
Funk…christened “vitamines”…These special molecules, which at first were 
isolated from foods and then later synthesized in a laboratory, could cure people 
overnight…it really wasn’t until late in the twentieth century that nutrients began 
to push food aside in the popular imagination of what it means to eat (2008, p. 
21-22). 
 
As Pollan points out, vitamins were originally isolated from foods and only later 
synthesized in laboratories. To remove something that is a vital part of a food’s identity 
is to derange its natural and spontaneously arising division of labor. Durkheim deployed 
his synonym for derangement, anomie, in a wide variety of social contexts – so I extend 
it to food. 
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 In his discussion of the prevention of anomie in The Division of Labor (1893) 
Durkheim wrote, “we may say a priori that a state of anomie is impossible wherever 
organs solidly linked to one another are in sufficient contact, and in sufficiently lengthy 
contact” (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 304). One must ask what could possibly be in greater 
contact and be more solidly linked together than the vitamins and minerals that naturally 
occur in food? Yet the scientists disregard this and derange this division of labor all the 
same, introducing isolates and synthetic versions of both into the Western Diet with 
reckless abandon. Soylent proudly advertises that “each bottle of Soylent Drink delivers 
essential nutrients and eliminates hunger immediately.” There is no naturally occurring 
food that I have ever eaten or heard about that immediately eliminates hunger. This 
claim is likely a gross exaggeration, nevertheless, the creation of food that eliminates 
physical hunger is liable to release hungers of another sort – especially existential 
hungers. Indeed, if one was not constrained by hunger, thirst, or exhaustion and could 
live without attending to these basic needs, what would one do with all this extra time? 
Would the addition of chronological resources be sufficient to live a fulfilling life? 
These questions are interesting but they are not central tenants of this project, but I ask 
them to illustrate the bottomless pit that is at the heart of the human experience.  
Filling this bottomless pit is the topic of Michael Moss’s (in)famous book Salt 
Sugar Fat (2013) which describes the food industry as trying to get consumers addicted 
to its products. Far from just offering one too much food, or even food that is merely of a 
poor quality, Moss describes an industry actively engaged in producing ways to make 
people physiologically addicted to food. As such, dietary adages like “eat to live, don’t 
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live to eat” are foiled by the food industry’s efforts towards hooking people on their 
products.  
Of course, eating can be one of life’s great pleasures, especially with good 
company, and cultural practices centered around eating are a common feature of cultures 
all over the world. In the case of America, holiday meals like the turkey and dressing 
served at Thanksgiving are part of this “living to eat” collective representation since 
participation tends to involve overconsumption of very rich foods. The French obsession 
with food and wine is world-famous, as is the French paradox of low rates of heart 
disease, cholesterol, and diabetes despite a diet full of rich and fatty foods like butter, 
foie gras, and cheese. The division of labor’s moral force is felt keenly at table in both 
the American holiday meal case and the French case. Cooks and diners break bread 
together as the individual’s hunger is balanced by their moral community, usually 
represented through the people at table with the individual.  
The moral community’s role as a counterbalance to individual desire is not 
necessary unless the food supply is sufficiently developed so that an excess is attainable 
and available to a large group of consumers. In the absence of such technological 
development the moral community demands consumption on the part of its members as 
in the case of starving families who do not have enough food all their members. The 
decision of the parents to eat some of the food rather than let their children eat it all does 
not stem from individual egoism, but from social obligation to renew their will to life for 
another day. To refuse would mean to leave their child without a parent and so to 
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derange the familial division of labor. The topic of food and morality will be taken up in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters.  
The derangement of the division of labor is at the heart of the derangement of 
food in the 21st century America and the derangement of our relationship to it. Consider 
the following picture (Figure 5.) of Soylent Bar taken directly from the company 
website.  
 
 
Figure 5. Soylent Bar vs Junk Food 
 
The aim of the picture is a marketing strategy to suggest that one could eat a 
bunch of junk “food,” or they could eat the nutritious “Food Bar” that Soylent has 
engineered. While the picture is clearly meant to convey the “Food bar” as superior to 
the junk surrounding it, the picture could very well be titled “Engineered Ingredient 
Design” and be displayed in an art gallery as a work of satire. Nothing in the picture is 
food in the sense that I have stressed it from the beginning, that is, as the product of the 
spontaneous division of labor and consisting of its own unique division of labor formed 
through a mutually modifying process. What’s more, the things contained in the picture 
are perhaps better described as “edible foodlike substances” than as food (Pollan, 2008, 
p.1). In Socialism and Saint Simon (1928/1958) Durkheim wrote, “what caused the 
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failure of Saint-Simonianism is that Saint-Simon and his disciples wanted to get the most 
from the least, the superior from the inferior, moral rule from economic matter” (p. 240). 
Similarly, one can see Soylent and the food industry at large deranging food in an effort 
to get the superior from the inferior, health from foodlike substance, moral food from 
pursuit of profit.  
Perhaps it is unfair to single out Soylent, or the food industry for that matter, 
since the derangement in which they are engaging is, as I have said throughout, a rule 
that is a lack of rule, and one that is by no means confined to the food industry. Farmers 
markets are replaced by grocery stores and convenience stores while farmers and 
ranchers sell their products to these outlets without knowing when or where their 
products are being sold. To be sure, the earlier discussed antagonism between freedom 
from nature and dominion over it is the root of our present derangement of food, which 
is simultaneously the derangement of the relationships between producers and 
consumers. In modern life the principle of the strong linkages is excised from its place 
within the division of labor, and employed in the service of the food industry to produce 
cheap new foods that conjoin massive amounts of salt, sugar, and fat with the aim of 
hooking consumers, but as I will discuss in the next chapter, the food producers are 
hooked as well. There is one final layer to deranged food that I have yet to explore, the 
problem posed by adulterated and fake foods which I examine in the next section.  
Adulterated Food & Fake Food  
 Having taken such great pains in the preceding sections to define a word that 
most researchers believe is self-evident, I wish to take another step and argue that “real” 
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food should not need to be described as real, it should be sufficient to refer to it as food. 
In contrast, consumed substances that do not meet my definition of food should bear the 
scarlet letter of “food product,” “fake food,” or perhaps even “deranged food product” 
on their label.  
Deranged food’s final problem is that it is a wolf in sheep’s clothing, that is, it 
pretends to be harmless when it is actually harmful to the consumer’s body, their mind, 
and the political economy of the countries involved in its circulation13. Part of this 
problem lies in the realm of vested interests—food companies, diet gurus, supplement 
sellers—but the other part resides in the realm of consumer deception. Here I return to 
Michael Pollan who wrote, “For while it used to be that food was all you could eat, 
today there are thousands of other edible foodlike substances in the supermarket” 
(Pollan, 2008, p.1). Pollan wants consumers to eat more natural and sustainably raised 
foods, but he is mistaken in arguing that food is all that one could eat in the distant 
historical past. Although certainly not derangement in the sense of restricting their 
intrinsic division of labor, there has been deranged food in the sense of adulteration for 
long as there have been people to sell food.   
 Deception is immoral in the context of the division of labor because the organs 
are interdependent and strongly connected to one another. One of Durkheim’s best 
                                                
13 The article “Don’t Take Your Vitamins” (2013) by Paul Offit cites multiple studies that show 
vitamin supplements result in poorer health. Offit discusses the “some is good so more is better” 
argument used by vitamin companies to justify the excessive doses contained in their pills. 
Finally, Offit explains that antioxidant pills do not work like antioxidants work in food since 
their concentration in pill form leads to an imbalance between free radicals and antioxidants in 
the body and, correspondingly, to health issues.  
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examples of the derangement of the division of labor is his discussion of cancer and 
tuberculosis of which he writes: 
In the same way that tuberculosis and cancer increase the diversity of the organic 
tissues without it being possible to see in this a fresh specialisation of the 
biological functions. In all these cases there is no allocation of a common 
function, but within the organism, whether it is individual or social is formed 
another one that seeks to live at the expense of the first one (Durkheim, 
1893/1984, p.291). 
 
 In the context of the context of the economic division of labor where each 
producer specializes in one product to increase productivity and quality, adulteration of 
food is parasitic since its practitioners do not introduce a specialty, but only a fake with a 
specialty price tag. The production of a new specialty food stuff dependents on its 
creator harnessing the natural properties of the foods involved, which need not be the 
result of conscious effort but could result from a mistake like adding too much of 
something to the recipe or letting it age until fermentation takes over. In the case of these 
“accidental” creations, the cook must return to the kitchen to try and figure out what 
happened to produce these results. The culinary faker need only devise a way to cloak 
his/her wares enough to fool unsuspecting consumers, a process that is much easier 
when the product being peddled is exceedingly rare. Bill Briwa of the Culinary Institute 
of America summarized this point with his example of truffle oil writing, “There’s 
nothing even remotely natural about it. Truffle oil is all manufactured. Truffles are one 
of those one-percenter foods that very few people get to ever taste, so it’s easy to pawn 
off manufactured oil” (Olmstead, 2016, p.105). While the adulteration of rare food stuffs 
either by stretching them—adding canola oil to Tuscan olive oil to raise the profit 
margin—or by faking them outright – truffle oil is not produced with truffles, but with 
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organic compound called 2,4-Dithiapentane. This is to say, adulteration relies on 
consumers remaining ignorant and sellers maintaining the trust of their clientele.   
 Similarly, the introduction of synthesized vitamins, minerals, and antibiotics into 
our food supply are not new specializations within the food system, but rather parasitic 
manipulations that make us and our food system more dependent on these rogue 
elements. As I discussed earlier, ecosystems are the products of a moral community 
formed through the spontaneous mutual modifications of the division of labor acting on 
a wide variety of organisms. The strong mutual dependence eases the struggle for 
existence and leads to the destruction of organisms that are parasitic without introducing 
some new specialization to the division of labor. Monocultures are becoming the rule, 
rather than the exception, when it comes to industrial agriculture and the lack of 
diversity produces many problems for the crops which must be treated with pesticides. 
This rule that is a lack of rule, the crowning feature of derangement for Durkheim, 
destroys the moral community of the ecosystem and its degeneration is marked by plants 
and animals with considerably less nutritional value. In addition, the introduction of 
these chemicals produces insects that are resistant to the toxins and crops that are subject 
to mutated forms of common plant diseases.   
Genetically modified organisms (GMO) are considered deranged principally 
because their modification is not mutual, that is, because their modifications are aimed at 
adding nutrients to a particular plant with the goal of filling a nutritional gap in the diet. 
The continued manipulation of crops to produce new crops with different nutritional 
properties sounds innocent enough, however, should these new crops become popular or 
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useful in processing food they will quickly receive the same mono-culture treatment that 
has been given to corn, wheat, and soy and their nutritional value will be sacrificed for 
higher yields and longer shelf life.   
One may be able to develop a strand of corn or wheat that is resistant to extreme 
heat or cold, but the question becomes if it is resistant to other organisms that are also 
adapted to the extreme heat and cold? If this GMO crop produces more nitrogen or needs 
more sunlight than the plants that appear naturally in this environment, then the GMO 
crop will have a negative effect on the environment. The introduction of foreign species 
to domestic habitats serves a cautionary tale since some of these foreign species can 
become invasive, displacing native organisms and harming the environment. The rusty 
crayfish, northern snakehead, and carp are all invasive aquatic organism whose primary 
impacts on their environment are the displacement of native fish by predation – reducing 
the types of species—and the destruction of aquatic plant environments including 
stirring up the bottom. This reduces the clarity of the water making it difficult for birds 
to feed, other fish to mate, and other species to feed on the invading species.  
The damage wrought on an environment by species that are not in sync with the 
ecosystem can be truly devastating.  Again, since ecosystems arise from moral 
communities formed among organisms engaged in the spontaneous mutual modification 
of the environment and their fellow organisms, there is no way for humanity to engineer 
and introduce a GMO food into an environment without considerable risk, and the 
inevitable consequences which could be good, but are most likely bad. A full discussion 
of these consequences is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but future work could 
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investigate the consequences that GMO food has on environments and their 
interdependency.  
Returning to the topic of GMO foods, another issue raised by their use is food 
scientists, far from taking account of what a plant had to offer in its unadulterated state, 
view the plant as deficient from the outset and in need of repair. Such is the case of the 
high yield variations of wheat, corn and soy that are grown in vast farms all over the 
world. These crops are engineered to produce a very high yield, which means less of the 
volatile nutrients that attract pests which also reduce the shelf life of these crops. 
Moreover, their widespread use in all corners of the food industry is frightening since 
these monocultures must all be heavily “medicated” if they are to survive in their 
drastically less diverse ecosystem and make it all the way to the factories where they are 
processed into millions of different products.  
As I have maintained throughout, the intersecting stream of the division of labor 
give rise to the ecosystem through the gradual process of mutual modification. Food 
adulterators rely on modifying the food, since it cannot modify the consumer, but this 
adulteration is not what the consumer wants so measures must be taken to fake what the 
consumer wants. Larry Olmstead (2016) offers the instructive example of farmed salmon 
writing: 
Of course, in the wild salmon don’t use any antibiotics. And they don’t have to 
be artificially colored pink. Most fish-farm feeds don’t include krill, a mainstay 
of the salmon’s natural diet, which is what gives the fish its distinctive color, so 
farmed salmon are dyed to look like naturally occurring salmon (Olmstead, 2016, 
p.62).  
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 One may rightly be disgusted that farmed salmon must be dyed to produce the 
color that we have come to expect from its wild relative. Moreover, the adulterating of 
salmon, and fish in general, is pervasive and widespread leading to mass consumption of 
deranged food that is actively advertised as healthy by the USDA14 to say nothing of 
Diet Gurus, chefs, and personal trainers. It boggles the mind to think of dyeing salmon 
pink -there is a specific shade of pink named after the natural color of the fish- and 
recent studies on the fish used in sushi restaurants only serve to throw the mind into 
greater chaos. A nonprofit marine conservation group, Oceana released the result of their 
study that found diners who order red snapper in a restaurant receive the real thing less 
than 6 percent of the time. A Boston Globe investigation of seafood fraud turned up: 
Minado, a bustling buffet restaurant right off Route 9 that churns out hundreds of 
rolls of sushi and nigiri pieces daily, admitted it labeled tilapia as red snapper. 
‘Not because we are trying to trick,’ said Alexa Poletti, a Minado manager. 
‘We’re doing it how everybody does it (Olmstead, 2016, p. 54).  
 
 If adulteration is so widespread that managers feel that they are not being morally 
dubious by claiming that their products are something that they are not –Tilapia a farm-
raised scavenger fish is completely different than the carnivorous wild Red Snapper- 
then there is sufficient evidence that the food system itself has become deranged, that is, 
subject to rules that are actually lack of rules. 
                                                
14 Consumer advocate and activist Alexandra Morton offer two important points about this: 1. 
Farm raised salmon are good sources of Omega 3 Fatty Acids, but they also contain considerably 
more fat than their wild brethren since they swim in circles while their relatives swim down 
rivers, into oceans, and then back up to rivers. 2. Farm raised salmon must be treated for sea lice 
at least once during the course of their life using a neurotoxin – Slice.  
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CHAPTER VI 
POSTEMOTIONAL FOOD 
In the preceding chapters, I sketched the particulars of food and derangement that 
have come to characterize the food system in the 21st century. Up until this point I have 
made a concerted attempt to avoid talking about the broader forces at play, particularly 
those social forces associated with economics and culture. The central argument of this 
chapter is that modern society—and the modern food system by extension—can best be 
described as “postemotional.” Recent studies of the American food system focus on the 
food system as a capitalist enterprise, often invoking Marx or Marxist concepts, they 
criticize food companies as exploiting consumers, especially the poor, racial minorities, 
and female consumers. Such studies, while certainly informative, serve to further distort 
our picture of the modern food system as driven by exploitation of knowledge and skill. 
Drawing from Mestrovic’s Postemotional Society (1997), I wish to argue, “synthetic, 
quasi-emotions become the basis for widespread manipulation by self, others, and the 
culture industry as a whole” (p. xi). In extending Mestrovic’s thesis to the study of food, 
I seek to break the sociology of food from its modernist and postmodernist habits of 
mind, which have prevented it from adequately theorizing the problems faced by 
members of all social classes, racial groups, and genders. To better understand our 
present situation in capitalist American, this chapter begins with a recontextualization of 
Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism with special attention directed 
to the role of emotions. I then move to discuss Eros as a force in the individual and 
within society through a comparative reading of Plato, Freud, Durkheim, and Mestrovic. 
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Finally, I recontexualize Eros and its sickly modern relative, postemotional Eros, in the 
context of the 21st century American capitalism- specifically in the food businesses.  
The Role of Emotions in Weber’s Protestant Ethic 
Weber’s famous The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904) 
identifies the religious doctrines of the calling and predestination as the driving forces 
for the explosive growth of capitalism in America. From the outset, Weber points out 
that the Protestant countries most influenced by these doctrines corresponded with high 
economic development not seen in their Catholic counterparts (Weber, 1904/2001, p.1-
8). He links this worldly asceticism primarily to two Protestant Doctrines, Luther’s 
doctrine of the Calling and Calvin’s doctrine of Predestination. Weber summarizes 
Luther’s doctrine of the calling, writing: 
it is an obligation which the individual is supposed to feel and does feel towards 
the content of his professional activity, no matter in what it consists, in particular 
no matter whether it appears on the surface as a utilization of his personal 
powers, or only of his material possessions (Weber, 1904/2001, p.19). 
 
One should note that the calling is not merely representation—it is much more 
than a doctrinal idea— it is felt, hence rooted in emotion, by the person at the perceptual 
level. By describing the calling as an obligation that is immediately felt, Weber’s 
discussion of the Protestant Ethic recalls earlier sections of this work on the division of 
labor and the immediate need that the parts of a healthy organism have for one another. 
In the forced division of labor, the parts of an organism do not recognize their common 
need for one another, and the transmission of the signals of pain do not pass from one 
part of the social body to the other—consequently, nothing is done to alleviate their 
suffering.  
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The calling takes a dramatic turn when paired with John Calvin’s doctrine of 
Predestination, which states some people were predestined for eternity in heaven with 
God and others predestined for eternity in Hell. The lists were set before the creation of 
the world, and one’s deeds and actions did nothing to change which list they were one. 
There is an important distinction between the Doctrine of the Calling and the Doctrine of 
Predestination, namely, the individual person can feel their obligation to succeed and 
work hard in their activity as part of their Christian duty, but God has no duty to the 
individual. The feeling –used here in the literal sense to connote an emotional state— 
produced by the interplay of the two religious doctrines was an ever-present anxiety 
about which list a person’s name was on. Weber’s summary of this idea is as painfully 
poignant: 
In what was for the man of the age of the Reformation the most important thing 
in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path alone to meet a 
destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity. No one could help him. 
No priest, for the chosen one can understand the word of God only in his own 
heart. No sacraments…no Church…Finally, even no God. For even Christ had 
died only for the elect (Weber, 1904/2001, p. 60-61).  
 
To this end, Heaven was not a place that the believer could journey, but one of 
only two possible final destinations. Unsurprisingly, this produced an “unprecedented 
inner loneliness of the single individual” such that even when they were surrounded by 
like-minded believers they were always alone (Weber, 1904/2001, p. 60). The 
combination of the two doctrines resulted in the multiplication of their individual effects, 
producing a collective and normative state of anxiety from which the religious person 
could never free themselves. One means of coping with this anxiety was the search for 
signs that one was a member of the elect. Following the death of Calvin –who argued we 
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could never know the mind of God and, consequently, never be certain of our 
salvation—theologians working in his tradition prescribed worldly activity as the most 
suitable means for attaining the self-confidence needed to be sure of one’s own status as 
a member of the elect (Weber, 1904/2001, p.65-67).  
Recontexualizing Weber’s Protestant Ethic  
The overwhelming response to these doctrines was a shift in the habits of mind to 
worldly asceticism, the practice of which produced the thriving capitalism of which 
America is so (in)famous. The primacy of emotions in such prescriptive measures is 
essential to understanding the Protestant Ethic, as worldly activity was both a response 
to the anxious feelings, and a rational deterrent of such feelings. The lonely individual of 
Weber’s Protestant Ethic is recontexualized in Riesman’s famous work, The Lonely 
Crowd (1950). Riesman argues that for much of America’s history its population could 
largely be labeled as inner-directed. Riesman described inner-directed society, writing: 
Such a society is characterized by increased personal mobility, by a rapid 
accumulation of capital (teamed with devastating technological shifts), and by an 
almost constant expansion…The greater choices this society gives—and the 
greater initiatives it demands in order to cope with its novel problems—are 
handled by character types who can manage to live socially without strict and 
self-evident tradition direction (Riesman, 1950/2001, p. 14). 
 
Inner-directed societies, as their name implies, implant their values and goals 
within members while they are young. Traditional constraints are loosened, tradition 
governed responses to every situation are impossible, so the individual is equipped with 
a psychological gyroscope that keeps them “on course” (Riesman, 1950/2001, p.14-16). 
As Weber already noted, America’s social character was largely influenced by religious 
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doctrine, which set both the gyroscope and the motor in motion15. Today, modern 
capitalism is still marked by these religious doctrines as companies act with anxious 
fervor to prove they are on the “good list,” and hence, one of the saved. Wall Street 
serves as the penultimate example of this phenomenon since dramatic shifts in stock 
prices are frequently linked to investor’s fears and anxieties –both feelings stemming 
from emotional responses— related to a company’s future prospects at domination or 
being dominated. This is very interesting given large financial companies advise their 
stock traders never to trade with emotion. In her article in Business Insider, Linette 
Lopez describes the emic perspective of Wall Street traders writing, 
The Wall Street trader, at least in Wall Street's imagination, is a cowboy 
swaggering with silent confidence. Knowledge and logic are their guides. 
Emotion, whoever is teaching you will tell you, distracts your mind from solid 
facts — and in trading, they say, those are all that matter (Lopez, 2016).  
 
Contempt for emotion and the privilege accorded to rationality are values derived 
from the Enlightenment in the Western intellectual tradition. The advice seems to be that 
ignoring emotions and focusing purely on reason will lead traders to make fewer poor 
investments and produce greater financial gains. However, whispers about the possibility 
of corporate takeovers or the declining health of a CEO can send stock prices into a 
freefall. The stock trading website Tradeking.com says as much reporting, “unofficial 
news, also known as "rumors", can have as much impact on stock prices as official news 
announcements. The stock market often anticipates these news stories and "prices in" its 
                                                
15 Weber noted that idleness was among the greatest sins in the Protestant religion  
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expectations accordingly.16” However, as anyone who has taken an in-class exam they 
feel ill-prepared for can attest to, the anticipation of an emotion can trigger another, and 
perhaps a stronger, response in an individual. In the student’s case, stress at the prospect 
of doing poorly on an exam magnifies the anxiety triggered by taking a timed exam in 
class.  
The problem here is not reason, it’s the belief that emotion leads to nothing but 
poor decisions and, consequently, should be constrained by the super-power common to 
all humans – reason. Yet, as Weber’s Protestant Ethic demonstrates, reason is not up to 
the task of downplaying emotion since the feelings of anxiety and despair are ever-
present—and extremely powerful— even if they are not supposed to be consciously 
contemplated. 
The problem of reason vs. emotion was taken up by famed Portuguese 
Neurologist, António Damásio, who described Rene Descartes’ mind/body dualism as 
perpetuating the belief that reason and emotion are entirely separate. In his book, 
Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994), Damásio advanced 
his “somatic marker hypothesis,” which states emotional processes exert considerable 
influence on individual behavior—including decision making—through the associations 
forged between bodily feelings and emotions, like the association of anxiety with rapid 
heartbeat or nausea with disgust. In light of Damásio’s hypothesis, my characterization 
of the Protestant Ethic as rooted in emotion AND reason gains ground on the 
                                                
16 Tradeking.com “How News and Rumors Effect Stocks” 
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characterizations of capitalist society advanced by the Critical School and the Post 
Modernists,17 which focus almost exclusively on rationality. The nature and power of 
these emotions will be explored in subsequent sections of this chapter. For now, I only 
wish to say that modern capitalism is driven by synthetic emotions, revived for the 
purpose of driving consumption.   
The Labors of Eros: Plato, Freud, & Durkheim   
 Damasio’s hypothesis leads one to rethink much of one’s position on the 
interplay between rationality and emotion, and by extension, the interplay between the 
individual and the group. Plato’s comments on the purpose of education—to teach 
people to love the true, the good, and the beautiful—and the importance of ordering the 
soul are made even more startling in light of Damásio’s hypothesis. In his dialogue 
Phaidrus, Plato offers the allegory of the charioteer and the two winged horses. The 
charioteer represents Reason, while the noble white horse represents spirit and the 
ennoble black horse represents desire. One could argue that the charioteer, Reason, is 
supposed to restrain the two horses and order them. However, I believe there is a 
different argument to be made, namely, the Charioteer depends on the horses to drive 
him and the horses depend on the charioteer and each other for restraint. This requires a 
bit of unpacking since the dependence of the charioteer is perhaps not immediately 
noticeable, but it is obvious when brought into dialogue with Durkheim’s discussion of 
                                                
17 For an intensive discussion of the Critical School and the Postmodernist neglect of emotions 
see Mestrovic’s Postemotional Society (1997) 
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the division of labor. Describing the roles of the various organs in the body, Durkheim 
writes: 
What gives unity to organized societies… is the spontaneous consensus of parts. 
Such is the internal solidarity which not only is as indispensable as the regulative 
action of higher centres, but which also is their necessary condition, for they do 
no more than translate it into another language and, so to speak, consecrate it. 
Thus, the brain does not make the unity of the organism, but expresses and 
completes it (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 297). 
Since the chariot is pulled by horses, it might be argued, the absence of horses 
renders the chariot useless and the charioteer stranded. The reigns keep the horses bound 
together—dependent on one another in the sense that one tripping or getting injured 
likely means the other one will fall too—and connected to the charioteer. In the absence 
of a charioteer and reigns, nothing binds the horses together or constrains their free 
expression. One may argue that Reason is linked to spirit and desire and depends on 
them for the essential energy for existence— Eros. Schopenhauer captures this idea in 
his The World as Will and Representation (1819/1969) writing:  
Because the inner being of nature, the will-to-live, expresses itself most strongly 
in the sexual impulse, the ancient poets and philosophers—Hesiod and 
Parmenides—said very significantly that Eros is the first, that which creates, the 
principle from which all things emerge (Schopenhauer, 1819/1969, p. 330).  
 
 According to Freud, whose debt to Plato was very great18, the purpose of Eros is 
“to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together” 
(Freud, 1938/1974, p. 18). Freud builds on this idea in Civilization and its Discontents 
writing, “civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine 
                                                
18 For a discussion of this see Mestrovic’s In the Shadow of Plato: Durkheim and Freud on 
Suicide and Society (1985) 
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single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into 
one great unity, the unity of mankind (Freud, 1930/1961, p.81). One may immediately 
recall the claims made earlier in this work about the primary function of the division of 
labor as a moral force that binds organisms together towards greater interdependence, in 
short, towards greater unity. Durkheim captures this idea succinctly and hints at an 
additional dimension, writing: 
The most notable effect of the division of labour is not that it increases the 
productivity of the functions that are divided in this way, but that it links them 
very closely together. In all these cases its role is not simply to embellish or 
improve existing societies, but to make possible societies which, without these 
functions, would not exist (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 21). 
 
 Durkheim’s depiction of the division of labor as the driving force towards greater 
unity between all organisms, including humans, mirrors Freud and Plato’s depiction of 
Eros. Following Freud’s description, Eros strives towards greater unity, which Durkheim 
points out makes new societies—and new moralities by extension—possible that were 
not possible before. Presumably, Durkheim developed this idea from Schopenhauer—
whose influence on Durkheim was very great—who depicted the creative essence of 
Eros by referencing the Greek thinker Pherecydes who wrote, “Zeus transformed himself 
into Eros, when he wished to create the world” (Schopenhauer, 1819/1969, p. 330). 
Plato’s allegory of the charioteer and the two horses, when revisited in light of the 
essential function of Eros, becomes increasingly rich. The reins binding Reason to Spirit 
and Desire express and complete the unity of the chariot, they are the culmination of 
Eros’ project. Consequently, in their absence—or the absence of Reason, Spirit, or 
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Desire—there results a derangement of the division of labor where some parts thrive at 
the expense of others19.  
Postemotional Eros – The New Spirit of Capitalism  
Having discerned the interplay and interdependence between rationality and 
emotion, and the centrality of Eros in social life, a new problem presents itself. How is 
the depiction of the division of labor, with its uncanny resemblance to Eros in Plato & 
Freud, similar or different from the division of labor in modern society, that is, can the 
preceding section be recontextualized to inform the present fin de siècle? I believe the 
misunderstandings of the division of labor, like the reduction of Eros to pure sexual 
desire, provide a false starting point for our investigation of modern capitalism and, 
following Plato and Schopenhauer, I argue that the most important part of an argument is 
its starting point. To this end, a few more remarks about the parallel forces of Eros and 
the division of labor are necessary.  
The power of Eros is legendary in Plato’s philosophy as well as Freud’s 
psychology and, like all powerful things, the risk of harm resulting from misuse is a 
constant danger to those driven by the divine madness as well as the those around him. 
However, one may note that Plato’s Republic is much more an education about Eros than 
an attack on its attendant problems. Indeed, it is Glaucon’s Eros that drives the entire 
dialogue and pushes Reason, personified in the character of Socrates, to account for and 
define justice when his other interlocutors fail to provide the impetus. The Republic 
                                                
19 This idea is given manifest expression in Durkheim’s division of cancer and tuberculosis in 
The Division of Labor in Society (1893), which I discussed in earlier chapters  
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begins with the famous line, “Down I went to the Piraeus,” which is typically described 
by Plato scholars as describing Socrates’ descent from the heights of philosophy—and 
its focus on Eros’ drive towards love of wisdom— into the realm of common men. 
Keeping Schopenhauer & Plato’s claim that the most important part of any argument is 
its starting point in mind, this first line must contain information that is vital to 
understanding the rest of the dialogue. Socrates serves as the narrator for the entire 
dialogue—he is recounting to another person the events of the day before—and as 
Athens’ great teacher, one may suppose that his retelling of this story is supposed to be 
educative. Even the final portion of the work, the myth of Er, is an education in the raw 
power possessed by Eros and the importance of the alliance between Reason and Spirit 
to educate Eros, for if left to its own devices, it could never find fulfillment20. Returning 
to the allegory of the charioteer and the two horses from Plato’s dialogue, Phaedrus, the 
charioteer represents Reason, while the noble white horse represents spirit and the 
ennoble black horse represents desire. Capitalism in the 21st century has seen Reason—
in a perfect example of the irrationality of rationality21— prescribe the black horse 
steroids and, in accordance with Riesman (1950), reduced the spirited white horse to 
                                                
20 In the myth of Er, Plato sketches a troubling vision of the afterlife, one where the people who 
lived good lives get to spend time in a quasi-heaven and those who lived a bad life spend time in 
a quasi-hell. Aside from the  souls of tyrants and murders, who are forever banished to the quasi-
hell, everyone else returns to a middle ground where they draw lottery tokens and choose their 
next life in the order their tokens are called. Er observes that most souls pick a different life than 
the one they lived before – the good man becomes a tyrant, the bad man becomes good, animals 
become humans, and humans choose animal life—the implication being that all souls eventually 
choose to become tyrants and end up getting banished to eternity in the quasi-hell. Plato believes 
the Philosopher, whose Eros is sublimated towards love of wisdom, can break this cycle.  
21 For an excellent discussion of this idea see George Ritzer’s The McDonalization of Society 
(1993) 
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fake niceness and curdled indignation. Consequently, the chariot continues to go in 
circles with no signs of stopping or slowing down, even if it Charioteer wanted to stop, 
the spirited horse is no match and cannot keep up.  The vigorous Eros which Plato, 
Freud, and Durkheim all viewed as the driving force of existence is deranged in 
postemotional society. One might be tempted to describe this process as 
“disenchantment,” as Ritzer does22, but this would be incorrect since it implies that the 
spell has been broken, when it is really a more powerful and restrictive spell. The 
desiring part is artificially ignited, while the spirited part smolders beneath the weight of 
extreme rationalism which draws on past emotions to express present states of being. 
The essence of Eros—its drive towards greater unity, complexity, interdependence, and 
completeness—has been abolished in favor of rational man and his rationalized, pre-
packaged emotions.  In short, the modern situation find expression in C.S. Lewis’ 
Abolition of Man, in Freud’s writing on Thanatos, and Durkheim’s conception of 
anomie—in each case, the rule has become the lack of rule. This driving force towards 
greater unity, divided against itself, fueled by recycled emotions and inflamed desires is 
postemotional Eros. 
The extension of Mestrovic’s postemotional theory, with its implicit conception 
of Eros—owing to Plato, Freud, and Durkheim’s influence on Mestrovic— to my 
explicit use of the term postemotional Eros is theoretically useful insofar as it allows one 
to account for the discrepancy between the driving forces behind modern Capitalism and 
                                                
22 See Ritzer’s Enchanting a Disenchanted World (2009) 
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the Capitalism of the American past best exemplified in Weber. In addition, I follow 
Mestrovic’s lead in arguing that the role of emotions has been neglected at best in 
sociological theory and deserves further investigation (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 3). The 
theoretical study of the relationship between emotions and food seeks to reconcile the 
two poles of human experience: reason and emotion.  
The food industry exploits the emotions of consumers—specifically the 
prepacked emotions related to comfort, happiness, and belonging—to boost sales and 
increase the value of stock. Through a recontextualized reading of Mestrovic’s 
postemotional theory, I analyze the practices of the food industry and what might 
broadly be termed the ‘consumption industry.’ Mestrovic (1997) writes, “postmodern 
culture feeds parasitically on the dead emotions of other cultures and of the past in 
general” (p. 1). One need only look into Coca Cola’s marketing campaigns to 
immediately get at the truth of the matter. As I write this, the Coca Cola billboard off the 
highway by my San Antonio home proclaims, “taste the feeling.” Taste, which is 
sensory and genetic, has little if nothing to do with emotions, which are, historically, 
powerful and unpredictable. A 1980’s advertising campaign included Bill Cosby touting 
Coke as “the real thing,” implying that Coke’s competitor, Pepsi, was not the real thing 
(Moss, 2013, p.107). One is left to wonder how a beverage made with artificial flavors 
and colors—and which induces artificial feelings of hunger— can claim to be real 
anything? In both cases, Coca Cola appeals to the emotions of potential consumers 
particularly the fear of being cheated, the anxiety of being left out, and the promise that 
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consumption of one of its products will produce a pleasant bodily feeling (from the sugar 
and carbonation) and a pleasant emotional feeling (social approval).   
Investigative journalist Michael Moss interviewed former Coca Cola Executive 
Jeffrey Dunn as part of his book on the food industry, Salt Sugar Fat (2013). Dunn 
summarized the marketing strategy of Coca Cola saying, “Why does Coke market?...The 
answer is because you’re either going forward or you’re going backwards” (Moss, 2013, 
p.108). Consider the following quote from famed Nutritionist and Sociologist, Marion 
Nestle who writes: 
The primary goals of food companies are to sell products, increase returns to 
investors, and report quarterly growth to Wallstreet…food companies can argue 
that what you eat is your responsibility, but their corporate responsibility is to 
induce you to buy more food, not less. Eating less – a principal strategy for 
managing weight—is very bad for business (Nestle, 2002/2013, p. xiii). 
 
There is perhaps no better personification of this point than a sign I have seen 
hanging in multiple Jimmy John’s sandwich shops which reads, “the gap between more 
and enough never closes.” Indeed, if companies are not selling more, they are selling less 
and, if they are selling less, then someone else is likely selling more23. The quote’s 
relevance applied to the consumers of these products as well, since the consumption of 
these products or the abstaining from them marks one as a member of the “good list” 
depending on their group associations and culture. For example, if eating some low fat 
foods is good then eating more of them must be better. Yet the overconsumption of low-
                                                
23 The principle for determining how much of the market a given company controls in referred to 
as “stomach share,” as in, how much of a person’s stomach is filled by a particular company’s 
products  
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fat fare results in diets that are not markedly different from those of people who eat full-
fat foods but eat less of them24. What’s more, low-fat foods are frequently deranged—in 
the sense that I used the term in the preceding chapter, that is, fortified, artificial, GMO, 
or otherwise reconfigured for greater shelf life— so their over-consumption produces 
new health problems associated with the overconsumption of artificial sweeteners and 
artificial flavors, which are added to the recipes to elicit somatic responses amenable to 
overconsumption. An important caveat to this is food companies do not want to 
stimulate your appetite for another company’s products. The alliance between food 
companies may appear to make strange bedfellows, but the alliance formed through 
symbiosis since their products work together to increase consumption. The high levels of 
sodium in fast food induce thirst in their consumers and the high levels of sugar in the 
beverages light up the pleasure centers in the brain without alerting the stomach that it is 
full. The food industry cannot make money if people don’t consume its products, and 
individual companies cannot increase their share if their products produce cravings for 
another company’s products. In this regard, the reciprocal relationship between soda 
manufactures and fast foods is the best case scenario in the industry since one 
company’s success fuels success in the other.  
However, success is an abstract phenomenon without defined limits, as such, 
margins are always approached from the perspective that costs can be cut further and 
profits increased. This unresolvable tension between more and enough, a problem with 
                                                
24 See Michael Pollan’s In Defense of Food (2008) 
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tremendous philosophical and existential significance, has its roots in the Protestant 
Ethic discussed earlier in this chapter. In lieu of the doctrines of the calling and 
predestination, a person can never truly be sure that they are saved and, consequently, 
remain forever in a state of unrest and anxiety25. Durkheim captures this phenomenon in 
his book Suicide (1897), writing: 
When there is no other aim but to outstrip constantly the point arrived at, how 
painful to be thrown back…Since imagination is hungry for novelty, and 
ungoverned, it gropes at random. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man’s 
nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance (Durkheim, 1897/1950, 
p.257). 
 
Recall that Calvin’s solution to the problem of an unknowable future was his 
teaching that, “we should be content with the knowledge that God has chosen and 
depend further only on that implicit trust…he rejects that one can learn…if one is chosen 
or saved…it is an unjustifiable attempt to force God’s secrets” (Weber,1904/2001, p. 
65). Furthermore, followers of the Reformed Churches that accepted the doctrine of 
Predestination were taught that doubt of one’s salvation was a sign of imperfect faith, 
hence, of damnation. Understandably, this resulted in tremendous mental anxiety and 
tremendous physical, spiritual, and emotional effort to curb one’s inclinations towards 
conformity with the religious doctrines. The tremendous self-control and worldly 
asceticism lead Protestants to acquire tremendous wealth in their business ventures, and 
the teachings of the calling and the sin of idleness saw to it that all task masters had a 
highly-motivated work force. In so far as people were all children of God, business 
                                                
25 This is made all the more problematic since the doctrine of the calling contends that idleness is 
one of the greatest sins a Protestant can commit  
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owners were to treat their employees well and to resist the temptation to exploit, cheat, 
or steal from them. Of course, not all business owners followed this course of action and 
the exploitation of the worker was rationalized by the same doctrines that sought to 
remedy the problem on the grounds that great success in worldly endeavors, particularly 
the accumulation of profit, was a sign of one’s status as a member of the elect. In Suicide 
(1897), Durkheim touches on the normalization of ceaseless desire, writing: 
Yet these dispositions are so inbred that society has grown to accept them and is 
accustomed to think them normal…The longing for infinity is daily represented 
as a mark of moral distinction, whereas it can only appear within unregulated26 
consciences which elevate to a rule the lack of rule from which they suffer 
(Durkheim, 1897/1950, p.257). 
 
One should note Durkheim’s use of the phrase “rule that is a lack of rule,” since 
the presence of a rule, even one directed towards infinity, cannot be equated with that 
vulgar translation of anomie as “normless.” That is, Durkheim points to the rules as the 
sources of the problem for the human capacity for feeling is limitless and, with nothing 
to define its limits, the person breaches all boundaries and possibilities, none of which 
satiate their desires. In the past, American society’s inner-direction came from its 
Protestant roots, which advocated worldly asceticism on the one hand, but set definable 
limits to what the wealth acquired from such practices could be used for. However, these 
religious motivations began to fade as society shifted towards other-direction. Riesman 
outlines the attributes of the other-directed in The Lonely Crowd (1950), writing: 
What is common to all the other-directed people is that their contemporaries are 
the source of direction for the individual—either those known to him or those 
                                                
26 This translating is misleading. The French word déreglé is better translated as “without rule,” 
in the sense that the rule is “there are no rules.” 
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with whom he is indirectly acquainted, through friends and through the mass 
media. This source is of course “internalized” in the sense that dependence on it 
for guidance in life is implanted early. The goals toward which the other-directed 
person strives shift toward with that guidance: it is only the process of striving 
itself and the process of paying close attention to the signals from others that 
remain unaltered throughout life (Riesman, 1904/2001, p. 21, emphasis added). 
 
Other-directed society equips its members with radars capable of picking up 
signals from others, as oppose to the gyroscope inner-directed society equips its 
members with. The shift from inner-directed capitalism to other-directed capitalism 
results in the development of a character influenced by the Protestant past, but decidedly 
modern in its approach to business. For example, the capitalist culture –influenced as it 
was by the doctrines of the calling and predestination— mean no admission of weakness 
is allowed.  The giant food conglomerates must act as if they are one the good list and 
are not allowed to doubt their presence on it. One would be wrong to characterize this 
behavior as rational, since, in the case of food companies, the anxious fervor is worked 
out in a variety of ways including: product line extensions, product reformulations, 
funding neuropsychological research, sponsoring sporting events, targeted advertising 
campaigns, and corporate takeovers. On the other hand, the shift towards other-direction 
has resulted in large companies trying to clean up their image and appealing to 
consumers’ emotions. For example, McDonalds refers to their children’s meal as a 
“Happy Meal” complete with a small entrée, small fries, small soda, and a toy. These 
meals, believe it or not, actually do make children happy even if only for a limited time. 
The shift towards increasingly the likeability of one’s brand was not just for McDonalds, 
in fact, other-directed capitalism saw food companies line up to impress consumers with 
their niceness and likeability.  
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 This illuminates another part of former Coca Cola Executive Jeffery Dunn’s 
quote about moving forward and backwards, namely, those who are saved are always 
moving forward and those who are damned are always moving back. The exercise of 
worldly asceticism, here personified through aggressive marketing tactics, acts to 
combat the doubts that a company is destined for bankruptcy or corporate takeover. 
Dunn’s quote should not surprise anyone who has studied the tendencies of companies in 
capitalist societies, but it should give them pause rather than increased certainty about 
the nature of the capitalist beast. It should give them pause because it illustrates a 
collective state of enhanced desire, one that was once naturally lit but has since become 
mechanically inflamed—postemotional as it were. The artificially induced hunger 
designed to increase consumption and prevent the body’s natural defenses against 
overconsumption may appear to resemble Plato’s divine madness, but this would be an 
error in judgement. For one, Plato’s divine madness has the individual forget himself in 
his madness, lost as he is in his desire for another. In contrast, the engineered 
ingredients—deranged food was the term used in the previous chapter—induce hunger 
precisely at the moment a person seeks to sate it, for consumption only increases 
appetite. A person who begins thinking about something and cannot stop thinking about 
it until they have resolved it, may be diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder. 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,27  these 
obsessions are defined as: 
                                                
27 American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
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Recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges, or images that are experienced, at some 
time during the disturbance, as intrusive and unwanted…the individual attempts 
to ignore or suppress such thoughts, urges, or images or to neutralize them with 
some other thought of action (i.e. by performing a compulsion) (DSM 5, 2013, p. 
129).  
 
Modern American foodways consists of food companies instigating persistent 
thoughts and urges to eat by engineering foods to increase appetite, constantly placing 
food in front of people either through advertisements or through product location, and 
appealing to individual’s emotions through the marketing campaigns tailored to 
emotions. This is to say, the obsessions and compulsions experience in postemotional 
society are both cognitive and somatic, that is, both representation and will. One may ask 
if my characterization of modern foodways as the normalization of obsessive and 
compulsive consumption—consumption of food as well as consumption used in a 
broader sense—is too strong and sacrifices precision for shock value? My retort is a 
quote from Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950): 
My own belief is that the ambulatory patients in the ward of modern culture 
show many analogous symptoms of too much compliance and too little 
insight….Their lack of emotion and emptiness of expression are as characteristic 
of many contemporary anomics as hysteria or outlawry was characteristic of 
anomics in the societies depending on earlier forms of direction (Riesman, 
1950/2001, p.244-245).   
  
             As I have already said, it is not a lack of emotion than characterizes the modern 
anomic, but a postemotional Eros, in other words, a drive towards superficial unity. 
Material comfort concerns satiated, the modern person seeks emotional comfort which 
the food companies, cookbook authors, and television shows claim they can receive 
through the consumption of comfort food. In the past, eating a favorite dish prepared by 
a family member or friend was Erotic in the Platonic sense, that is, it was the fulfillment 
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of a desire for greater unity stemming from one’s feelings of incompleteness28. The 
displacement of Eros in the sexual sense to another object or desire – Plato argued that 
the philosopher’s displaced Eros pursued wisdom— was termed sublimation by Freud. 
However, modern foodways are driven by postemotional Eros and the desire for greater 
individual complexity and completeness through the consumption of other people’s 
comfort foods produced by grandmothers, street vendors, television chefs, and cookbook 
authors. There are three important problems with the postemotional approach to 
authenticity. First, it is thoroughly postemotional to assume comfort can be found on 
one’s plate simply because the emotional attachments attached to grandmothers is 
employed. Second, the milky way galaxy of choices described by Riesman in The Lonely 
Crowd (1950) may seem like a good thing for sublimation since each person is likely to 
find an outlet for their Eros. Yet, the vast quantity of choices and the fickleness of the 
force that directs sublimation (other-direction in modern society) lead to many small 
sublimations which cannot produce the outlet traditionally attributed to sublimation of 
Eros. The postemotional person craves authenticity and connection, seeks greater unity 
with the other which directs him, but all such attempts are akin to Sisyphus’ attempts to 
push a bolder up a hill only to watch it roll back down again. One cannot be increasingly 
united to an abstract other without forfeiting their individual attributes. This is not the 
same at retribalization or a return to tradition-direction since both of those cases 
                                                
28 I choose the phrase “feelings of incompleteness” to resolve two issues: 1) feelings of 
incompleteness do not need to be consciously processed to be acted upon since they are under 
the surface. 2) It follows from St. Augustine’s claim that humans are “eccentric beings” and 
Durkheim’s claim that our capacity for feeling is unlimited.  
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presuppose attachment to something concrete – a set of beliefs, customs, language, 
attire, foodways, and lifestyles. Postemotional society lacks this concreteness, for its 
organizing principles are democratization of thoughts and feelings such that there exists 
a repudiation of elitism—even the slightest inclination that someone might be more 
naturally gifted than others— with feelings of curdled indignation and fake sincerity 
since one should be liked rather than authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  131 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Postemotional Society & Postemotional Foodways 
 In my new hermeneutic reading and recontexualizing of Durkheim, Weber, 
Riesman, Mestrovic, & Plato I sought to expand their insights into the realm of 
theoretical food studies, which tend to have a Marxist bent to them and focus on 
exploitation along racial, gender, and class lines. In choosing these theorists, I hoped to 
illustrate that the derangement of the modern food system in America, which offers post-
emotional food choices to people of every class, race, and gender. Thus, culinary 
elitism—particularly the drive towards providing everyone with local and organic 
foods— is an insufficient means to fix our current problem. The mass production of such 
foods would entail their derangement. The problem is not one of ability—advances in 
science have increased our agricultural knowledge so that we understand what plants 
need to grow—but a problem of relations. The knowledge of how plants grow is one 
thing, but their cooperation within an ecosystem is quite a different way of thinking 
about their growth, relating more to perception and intuition than abstraction. To this 
end, the problem of derangement in the modern food system is one of relations, which 
have been cast in Spencerian terms of “survival of the fittest”—note the egoism and 
selfishness implicit in such a statement—rather than Darwinian terms of cooperation. 
Consequently, even though the infrastructure exists to transport food to every nook and 
cranny of the United States—whether on foot, by car, plane, boat, or mail—the 
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emotional infrastructure that facilitates cooperation between people is no longer a fixture 
in postemotional American society.  
 One may be tempted to criticize my emphasis on the role of relations and 
cooperation in the food system on the grounds that it sounds too sensational to be true, 
but this would be an error in judgement. It is the emotional infrastructure of society that 
orients Eros’ drive towards greater unity. This is why Socrates wanted to censor the 
poets in The Republic, because he viewed the poetry of Homer as directing Eros towards 
egoism, rather than justice. The emotional infrastructure binds the individuals and 
institutions that comprise society together through myths and rituals. Durkheim 
described the importance of such rituals in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 
writing: 
I have shown what moral forces it [society] develops and how it awakens that 
feeling of support, safety, and protective guidance which binds the man of faith 
to his cult. It is this reality that makes him rise above himself…This is so because 
society cannot make its influence felt unless it is in action, and it is in action only 
if the individuals who comprise it are assembled and acting in common 
(Durkheim, 1912/1995, p. 421).  
 
 The absence of these face-to-face experiences, which are increasingly replaced 
by communication via technology, weakens the emotional infrastructure of society, and 
threatens the very existence of society as a system of collective representations. In the 
absence of such rituals, with their emotional fervor and collective effervescence, society 
cannot consecrate itself and the fabric of society begins to decay. The hyper-rational 
American society deconstructed its myths and labeled them as racist, sexist, imperialist, 
and the like. The myths—including the story of the first Thanksgiving— now ring 
hollow, offering no comfort or common sense of belonging. We are not immigrants in a 
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strange land, but strangers in a land that has purged its sense of Eros. What remains is a 
tapestry woven in shades of gray. This is not simply the disenchantment of society; it is a 
new spell altogether. According to Durkheim’s disciple Maurice Halbwachs, the health 
of society under this new spell can be more or less approximated if one uses suicide as a 
measure of the suffering a given society. Halbwachs expands this idea, writing:  
We can assume that the number of suicides is a rather exact indicator of the 
amount of suffering, malaise, disequilibrium and sadness which exists or is 
produced in a group. Its increase is the sign that the sum total of despair, anguish, 
regret, humiliation, and discontent of every order is multiplying (Halbwachs, 
1930/1978, p.314).  
 
 One may consider the relatively recent diagnosis, and subsequent explosion, of 
compassion fatigue in America in light of Halbwach’s assertion. Compassion fatigue, a 
condition associated with loss of empathy and understanding for the suffering of others, 
was first diagnosed in nurses in the 1950’s. World War II was over and the American 
economy was thriving, but the common sense of purpose that characterized the war 
years had faded, leaving nothing to take its place. The timing of this diagnosis is 
especially interesting if one considers that David Riesman published The Lonely Crowd 
(1950)—with its characterization of other-directed society—at approximately the same 
time. The shift from inner-direction to other-direction saw compassion, which is directed 
outward in inner-directed societies, directed inward in other-directed society. 
Compassion is necessary to work in fields where people are hurting or in pain, whether 
the pain is physical (medicine), mental (psychology), or spiritual (religious life). What is 
interesting about compassion fatigue is that it is not a loss of compassion, but a 
redirection of compassion inward. As such, the rise of compassion fatigue can be viewed 
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as a rather exact measure of the lack of compassion that individuals feel they receive 
from outside, which is to say, from their relationships.  
Just as the relationships in society at large have changed, so the relationship 
between consumers and producers have changed as well—becoming much more 
impersonal. The result has been a shift in the attitudes of both producers and consumers 
from the emotionally potent Eros, to the impotent postemotional spirit that was best 
described by Simmel as blasé29. The problem then is not just the relations between 
producers and consumers, but the relations between politics and economics, between 
environmental awareness and production are all postemotional—hence, deranged. 
Postemotional relations can, at best, foster a spirit of superficial unity.  At their worst, 
postemotional relations replace genuine feelings of unity and connection with 
prepackaged emotions that are the equivalent of painting in grayscale. Even rage, which 
is theoretically anger to the nth degree, has become postemotional—as in the case of 
people “rage quitting” online video game matches—since the sight of an enraged person 
does little more than expedite the blasé emotions within the modern person. Finally, the 
explosion of online grocers and food subscription services has dovetailed with another 
interesting phenomenon, the dual disappearance of the store front and the telephone in 
business life. Many subscription service companies do not have store fronts since their 
business consist of packing up their wares and shipping them to customers directly from 
their warehouse, thus the person’s first interaction with a product comes after they have 
                                                
29 See Simmel’s The Metropolis & Mental Life as well as his essay, The Stranger both of which 
can be found in On individuality and Social Forms  
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already purchased it. Second, these same companies tend to only be available for support 
and complains via email. This is all the more surprising since the overwhelming majority 
of Americans own cell phones, but not these businesses. These are just two small 
examples of the derangement of relations between consumers and producers that is the 
rule in postemotional society.  
In describing American society as postemotional, I am drawing attention to the 
vast differences between modern American society and the inner-directed American 
society prior to World War II. These changes have yet to be adequately considered in the 
food studies literature, particularly in the literature that seeks to inform public policy. 
Indeed, in seeking to inform public policy the researchers are out of step with 
postemotional society at large, which has many weak convictions but only one truly 
strong conviction: all strong convictions are equally bad. Marx’s prediction of increasing 
class consciousness and the subsequent revolution that results from people’s shared 
sense of identity is impossible in postemotional society, irrespective of the country’s 
growing concentration of wealth in the pockets of the economic elites. The blasé attitude 
is the rule, rather than the exception, in postemotional society.  
Summary of Contributions 
From my perspective, there are at least ten contributions made to sociological 
inquiry in this dissertation. First, the integration of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the 
will, which was implicit in the classical social theory of Durkheim, is made explicit and 
extended to the sociology of food.  
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Second, Mestrovic (1988) and Mestrovic & Brown’s (1985) etymological studies 
of anomie were expanded with additional emphasis placed on the division of labor’s role 
in Durkheim’s conceptualization of anomie as “derangement.” Mestrovic’s (1985) claim 
that anomie is the secular is equivalent of sin was similarly expanded with special 
reference to St. Augustine’s theological anthropology—human beings are eccentric 
creatures who long for God— which was compared with the metaphysics of 
Schopenhauer and Durkheim to illuminate their common conception of limitlessness and 
ceaseless desire which are the hallmarks of anomie.  
Third, I discussed the ubiquity of the term “food,” critiqued of the various 
definitions of food, and subsequently advanced my own working definition of food. 
Food refers to something that sustains life, but does so through the utilization of the 
collective constituent elements (vitamins, minerals, calories) that naturally occur within 
a material substance. In other words, food is the product of ecosystem which arose from 
the formation of moral constraints between organisms dependent upon one another. My 
insistence on the collectiveness of these elements is important, leading to the conclusion 
that the whole of any food is greater than the sum of its collective parts.  
Fourth, Durkheim’s conception of the division of labor as a spontaneous and 
moral force was employed to aid in defining the difference between food and deranged 
food, thus creating a new means of talking about moral food that doesn’t rely on abstract 
models – economic or philosophical. 
 Fifth, the influence of Darwin’s emphasis on cooperation –as opposed to survival 
of the fittest—between organisms was made explicit in Durkheim’s work, through direct 
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quotes from Darwin as well as the American Sociologists Park and Burgess (1921). The 
primacy of cooperation for these theorists was presented and then extended to this 
project, which drew heavily from Durkheim.  
Sixth, the role of emotions in Weber’s study of the Protestant Ethic was 
illustrated with quotes from the original study and a corresponding discussion of the 
downstream societal effects as primarily driven by emotion. The most important of these 
emotions was anxiety, particularly as it presents as anxiety about one’s fate as either 
saved (good list) or damned (bad list).  
Seventh, Weber’s work was recontextualized to discuss the practices of large 
food companies in modern capitalism, specifically, their efforts to appear on the “good 
list.” Of particular note was the tendency of publicly traded companies to disparage 
emotions and emphasize rational choice when making decisions. Nonetheless, the stock 
market seems to fluctuate based on emotional response, including the public perceptions 
of a company as weak, exploitative, or otherwise engaged in morally dubious practices. 
Consequently, modern companies appear to be concerned with being on the “good list” –
which includes high profit margins, positive public image, and high sales volume—and 
the company must engage in business practices that give the impression that this is the 
case, even if the company is struggling.  
Eighth, I introduced a new term to the sociological lexicon, “postemotional 
Eros,” to describe the driving force of modern society as one of superficial unity. Raw 
emotion, with its overwhelming highs and lows, is traded for the more stable 
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prepackaged emotions which inform the economic, political, cultural, spiritual, and 
relational lives of modern people.  
Ninth, the work of food studies scholars and investigative journalists—Michael 
Pollan and Michael Moss in particular—concerning the marketing of large food 
companies was reevaluated in light of the Mestrovic’s postemotional theory, that is, 
advertising based on emotions was recontextualized within the broader framework of a 
society that feeds on prepackaged emotions.  
Finally, Durkheim’s writings on derangement were refracted through a 
discussion of the food industry’s manipulation of natural cognitive, somatic, and 
emotional responses. This final contribution is perhaps the most significant since it acts 
as a midpoint between placing all the blame on the company or on the individual 
consumer since the manipulation of these natural responses is widespread throughout 
“the consumption industry” and, moreover, throughout modern consumer society. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This study was undertaken with the goal of using classical sociology theory and 
recontexualizing it to discuss the problems and inner-workings of the modern food 
system. In deciding to rely heavily on primary sources, I was often forced to go along 
with the translations of those works that were not written in English—Durkheim and 
Weber in particular. In order to bridge the various interpretations that each translator 
offered, I strove to showcase the consistently of ideas as they appeared in each author’s 
work. In the case of Durkheim in particular, I endeavored to show how anomie 
concerned him from the publication of his dissertation (The Division of Labor in Society 
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– 1893) until the end of his life when he died before completing La Morale (1917).
Future research may explore the accuracy of the translations used, and in doing so, 
improve the precision with which such works could be recontextualized.  
            The methodology of this dissertation—in particular, its use of hermeneutics to 
understand social theory and food— is meant to serve at the starting point for a new 
approach to food studies and sociological theory. The art of understanding requires a 
considerable commitment to an individual author’s work, but anything less will yield 
only pieces of the puzzle. Without such commitment, the theorist’s picture of the world 
will remain hidden and the depth of their insights beyond our reach. The implementation 
of food as a vehicle for discussion gave the theories discussed herein a more definite 
medium for expression while also allowing observations to me made about the finite and 
the changing. It is hoped that future studies will imitate this method so they too can 
benefit from the clarity that it adds to abstract theoretical concepts. Finally, future 
research could also extend the hermeneutic approach used in this dissertation to the 
study of other social theorists, as well as to cookbooks, nutrition labels, and the 
packaging of processed food products.  
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